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1. Introduction 
 
“A City Reinvents Itself” (Schnorrenberger 2014). 
“A City on the Rise” (Becker et al. 2013). 
These are only two phrases that characterise the current structural developments in 
Bremerhaven. After a long period of time, during which the city mainly attracted attention 
with negative headlines on job cuts, unemployment rates, child poverty, and other social 
problems, the city is currently on the verge of changing its image (Arbeitnehmerkammer 
Bremen 2014; bremen.online GmbH 2013; Nordwestradio 2013). 
One element driving this structural change is the project called “Klimastadt Bremerhaven” 
(‘Climate City Bremerhaven’) that was officially launched in 2010. One reason why this 
decision was taken is the understanding that Bremerhaven will be affected by climate change 
in the future. As a city located on the North Sea coast, rising sea levels, stronger storms, and 
heavy rains involve high financial costs for the protection of coastal and port facilities. This 
reinforces Bremerhaven’s strong commitment to consider all opportunities that could limit 
climate change and to successfully adapt to its unavoidable impacts. However, climate 
protection will not only need infrastructure, but also societal changes. The Klimastadt project 
therefore also aims to stimulate public awareness of climate change and its impacts. 
Furthermore, it promotes Bremerhaven as a climate-friendly city and a centre of excellence 
for climate-related research across Europe, thus creating a positive image for the city and its 
citizens (PLACES 2014).  
It is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by the term “Klimastadt”: According to the 
definition provided by the project coordinator, the term describes a city that actively 
promotes the protection of climate and resources. Therefore, it takes visible and authentic 
climate protection measures. This involves self-regulation; however it also includes binding 
climate protection goals and a regular, transparent publication of the interim results. 
Moreover, the Klimastadt should be a member of regional as well as national networks that 
promote the protection of climate and resources. Ultimately, a Klimastadt also depends on its 
citizens: They have to show an outstanding ecological awareness to actually call a city 
“Klimastadt” (Schulz-Baldes 2012b: 1).  
 
The mission statement of the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project is supposed to serve as a 
model for all municipal action, but also behaviour and conduct of companies and citizens. It 
states “We, the citizens of Bremerhaven, act in a climate responsible manner, so that we and 
future generations can live in a city that is climate-friendly, worth living in, and that is 
prepared for the world of tomorrow. In Bremerhaven, climate expertise is visibly lived and 
experienced. Therefore, acceptance for joint action has to be created through mutual 
learning, competences have to be developed and expanded and responsibility has to be 
taken” (Schulz-Baldes 2012b: 2, translation by the author). The implementation of this vision 
includes an industry that is committed to the principle of sustainability, schools and higher 
education institutions offering specific projects or programmes, thematically related touristic 
attractions and exemplary urban planning and development in sectors such as facility 
management and public transport (AWI 2009: 3f.). 
Naturally, a project such as the Klimastadt Bremerhaven was not created in a vacuum. On the 
contrary, environmental and climate issues are very prominent on the international agenda. 
An important milestone was the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro, the largest international conference held to date. The Agenda 21 was 
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published at this conference and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was signed. Yet, climate change has proven to be more difficult to handle than 
anything that international level politics has encountered before: It threatens the living 
conditions of modern societies and questions our current energy use, transportation habits, 
and agricultural practices (Baylis et al. 2011: 347, 350, 356f.). 
In terms of climate policies, in 2007 the Environmental Council adopted binding legislation 
which includes the well-known 20-20-20 targets1 (European Commission 2014). Overall, 
environmental policy has grown from its initially marginal status to become one of the most 
active policy areas today. To respond to criticism concerning the effectiveness of policy 
measures, the EU has given increased attention especially to the implementation process, 
addressing, among other issues, the policy coordination across levels of governance 
(Lenschow 2010: 307ff.). 
Besides national efforts, much responsibility for environmental policies has actually been 
devolved downwards through the Local Agenda 21 process (Schreurs 2008: 347) and the 
number of German municipalities engaged in the process increased rapidly in the 1990s 
(Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 157). But today, most local working groups in Germany have 
stopped meeting on a regular basis or have been dissolved (Bulkeley/Kern 2006: 2253). 
Therefore, it is even more important to emphasise that action to achieve international, supra-
national or national climate targets needs to be taken, not only at the global, but also at the 
regional and local level. 
Municipalities produce a large share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions because of spatial 
concentration and diverse forms of utilisation (e.g. housing, business and industry, 
transportation, and leisure activities). At the same time, they have the potential and the 
competence to tackle climate change challenges (Difu 2011: 9). Local actors in Bremerhaven 
recognise this potential, while highlighting that municipalities are predestined to become a 
driving force for climate policies (AWI 2009: 3; ARSU/RaUm 2013: 9f.).  
Several analytical approaches deal with the challenges and opportunities of municipals’ room 
for manoeuvre, relating to environmental and climate policies. These analytical approaches 
include, for instance, the concept of ecological modernisation, which was developed 
independently by the German social scientists Jänicke and Huber in the 1980s (Huber 1982; 
1985; Jänicke 1983; 1984). They suggest that technological progress can help to solve 
environmental problems whilst at the same time increasing industrial competitiveness. This 
idea of a win-win situation for both the environment and the economy quickly influenced the 
political discourse in Germany. For example, a newly elected Red-Green federal government 
formulated a programme of ‘ecological modernisation’ in its coalition agreement in 1998 (e.g. 
Jänicke 2000, Mol/Jänicke 2010: 17ff.).  
However, the theoretical background for this thesis is provided using a local government 
perspective and a multi-level governance approach. At least partially, those two approaches 
lead to opposing assumptions concerning the political room for manoeuvre of municipalities. 
Political scientists working on local government issues assume that the following three 
structural developments led to a decrease of the spheres of activity of local government since 
the 1990s (Libbe et al. 2002; Wollmann 2002): EU-liberalisation, New Public Management 
(NPM), and the budgetary crisis led to a loss of political steering capacity at the local level (see 
also Bogumil/Jann 2009: 252, Holtkamp 2007: 367; 2012: 147f.). 
With regard to the broad literature on multi-level governance, a more differentiated picture 
emerges: Within the different approaches, European integration research describes the EU as 
                                                 
1 These targets include a 20 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from 
renewable resources to 20 % and a 20 % improvement in the EU's energy efficiency. 
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an interweaving system: competences are dispersed across different, but interconnected 
levels of policy-making. Therefore, all actors can and need to operate at several governance 
levels at the same time (Hooghe/Marks 2001: 3f.; Knodt/Große Hüttmann 2013: 189ff.). These 
authors demonstrate that multi-level governance provides new opportunities for 
municipalities to exert influence, exchange knowledge and/or to receive funding. On the 
other hand, the obligation to communicate with a huge number of actors at several 
governance levels can overwhelm municipalities, especially smaller ones that do not posses 
the necessary financial and personal resources (cf. Fleurke/Willemse 2007; Münch 2006; 
Rechlin 2004; Schultze 2003). 
Against this background, the following question arises: how does a structurally 
disadvantaged city such as Bremerhaven respond to the challenges and opportunities 
outlined above? To narrow down the scope of this work and to make manageable the 
empirical research within the time constraints, it focuses only on steering possibilities for the 
local government in climate change policies. That is why the main research question of this 
thesis is: To what extent does the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven enable the local authority 
to expand its scope of action and/or to develop new spheres of activity?  
The thesis tests the hypothesis that the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven is a political 
instrument or, more precisely, a coordination mechanism used by the municipality (local 
authority) to increase its spheres of activity and its scope of action. The project is supposed to 
ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors are consistent and coherent as well 
as in line with political objectives. 
To answer the research question and to test the hypothesis, this thesis explores the 
Klimastadt Bremerhaven project by analysing the political processes and key decisions, core 
actors and their positions, as well as the central administrative (or institutional) structures. It 
analyses how traditional institutional structures are changing in the area of local climate 
policy. The thesis focuses on Klimastadt project examples in the area of buildings, 
construction, and remediation, because those are of outstanding importance for climate 
protection measures: Around 40 percent of the energy consumed in Germany per year is 
currently spent on the supply of residential buildings (Klimastadt Bremerhaven 2013: 13). 
Moreover, private households as well as craft, trade, and services are predicted to have the 
potential for the highest reductions of CO2 emissions in Bremerhaven (up to 57 % by 2020 
compared to 1990; BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010: 46f.)2. Accordingly, by 2010, the largest 
share of CO2 reductions (- 35.5 %) in the city state had been achieved by improvements in the 
heating supply of buildings (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013: 19). In addition, 
the area of construction and remediation requires commitment of state actors, business 
actors, and private homeowners and is therefore a suitable example in terms of municipal 
steering possibilities.  
The Klimastadt initiative does not stop at the city’s boundaries, but tries to establish a 
network via activities and programmes within the region (PLACES 2014). Yet, due to reasons 
of space, this thesis can neither include Bremerhaven’s involvement in networks or alliances 
at the regional level nor at the national and international level.  
The thesis is divided into the following four chapters. First, the methodical approach is 
presented. Secondly, the theoretical part of the dissertation explains the challenges German 
local self-government is facing, but also the opportunities that are provided by the EU multi-
level system. Another focus is put on the socio-economic situation of Bremerhaven. Thirdly, 
the thesis analyses the role of three regional and local framework programmes for the 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately, a further specification of the categories is not provided by this study on different energy and climate protection scenarios for Bremen or 
the KEP 2020 monitoring. 
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Klimastadt project, before the project and its development are presented and analysed in 
detail. This part includes the whole process from initiation to implementation as well as key 
actors of the Klimastadt project. Fourthly, the thesis will go on to the analysis of project 
examples in the area of buildings, construction, and remediation. Finally, the conclusion 
summarises the findings, answers the research question, and indicates whether the 
hypothesis proves to be true or not. 
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2. Methodology 
 
The research methods for the empirical section of this thesis include an analysis of political 
and administrative documents of the Bremen Senate, the municipal council of Bremerhaven 
(Magistrat), the Bremen parliament (Bremische Bürgerschaft), the local parliament of 
Bremerhaven (Stadtverordnetenversammlung) including two of its committees, and the 
parliamentary factions of the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Moreover, the 
websites of the Klimastadt and several of its sub-projects form part of the analysis.  
Secondly, semi-structured interviews with actors of the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project were 
conducted. This type of empirical social research can generally be used (a) in an exploratory 
manner, (b) to deepen one’s own knowledge or (c) to generate theory. This thesis used the 
second type (systematising expert interview) which enables the interviewer to acquire 
practical knowledge from the expert’s personal experience and to gain insight into the actor’s 
perspective3. This permits the interviewer in a second step to reconstruct a process or social 
situation (Bogner/Menz 2009: 64ff., 71ff.; Gläser/Laudel 2010: 13).  
Four semi-structured, face-to-face interviews have been conducted for this thesis. The 
interviewees were Mr Scherzinger (Umweltschutzamt; Office for Environmental Protection in 
Bremerhaven), Mr Becker (energiekonsens, the local climate protection agency), Mr 
Schneeberg and Mr Wöhlken (Seestadt Immobilien, municipally owned enterprise to manage 
public buildings), as well as Mr Lückehe (STÄWOG, housing association of Bremerhaven). The 
use of an interview guideline allowed a rather flexible conduction of the interviews 
(Gläser/Laudel 2010: 42). The interviews took place between 14 February and 4 March 2014 in 
Bremerhaven.4  
The thesis uses the policy analysis approach. In this case, the major focus will be on three 
categories of analysis: (1) the institutional and administrative setting as well as the regulatory 
framework in which the Klimastadt project takes place; (2) the political process and key 
decisions; and (3) the actors involved in formulating and implementing the Klimastadt 
initiative, the relationship between actors in government, business, and civil society, and the 
special role of the local government in these local governance arrangements. Thus, it is 
possible to explore the questions of how actors are coordinated (process management and 
steering instruments), and whether the local government of Bremerhaven is still the steering 
centre of local climate policy action5.  
To get a clear idea of the policy options of local climate policy, the analysis further draws on 
four modes of governing described by Bulkeley and Kern (2006; see also Kern/Alber 2008) and 
a fifth mode that was identified by Bulkeley et al. (2009). First, self-governing describes “the 
capacity of local government to govern its own activities” (Bulkeley/Kern 2006: 2242). As cities 
have direct influence on their buildings, facilities, and vehicle fleet, they can easily implement 
energy management plans for municipal facilities or stricter regulations for new buildings. 
Secondly, governing by provision is “the shaping of practice through the delivery of particular 
forms of service and resource” (ibid.). This includes services such as energy supply or public 
transport, in other words infrastructure which is in public ownership. Thirdly, governing by 
authority refers to “the use of traditional forms of authority such as regulation and direction” 
                                                 
3 As is apparent from this sentence, an expert is a person who has thorough knowledge of the facts of the investigated cases or processes. This includes, for 
instance, knowledge related to the expert’s place of work (e.g. the company or organisation) and the working processes (Gläser/Laudel 2010: 11f.). 
4 For details see the list of interviews in Annex I. 
5 The analysing categories broadly follow two studies that analyse empirical examples of regional (Adamaschenk/Pröhl 2003: 34) and local governance 
(Geißel 2007: 29). Both authors refer to the theory of actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf 2000) as their conceptual basis. The category ‘process’ was introduced 
by Geißel, but is in general not central to the actor-centred institutionalism. 
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(ibid.), e.g. through the use of sanctions. Fourthly, governing through enabling characterises 
“the role of local government in facilitating, coordinating and encouraging action” (ibid.) 
through persuasion, argument, incentives or partnership with private actors. These are tools 
of ‘soft’ governing (Kern/Alber 2008:174; Alber 2009: 6)6.  
Finally, the fifth mode of governing is called partnership. It describes situations “in which non-
state actors work together with state actors in order to address climate change through 
providing information, undertaking voluntary action, and implementing projects” (Bulkeley et 
al. 2009: 8). Bulkeley and Kern (2006) conclude that self-governing and governing through 
enabling are the two modes of governing most frequently used by municipalities. As 
Bremerhaven no longer has municipal utilities (“Stadtwerke”), governing by provision is of no 
importance for this thesis. 
                                                 
6 See section 3.3.2 for further information on ‘soft’ forms of governance. 
 7 
3. Theoretical Background 
3.1 Public Service Provision and Other Responsibilities of Local 
Government 
 
Municipalities represent the lowest level in the three-tiered administrative structure in 
Germany, but under constitutional law, German municipalities are part of the Länder (states). 
This implies that state parliaments determine, for instance, municipal constitutions. The 
Länder (and also the Federation) assign certain activities to the municipalities 
(Auftragsangelegenheiten) and allocate the corresponding funding to them (Bogumil/Jann 
2009: 103f.).  
Yet, in international comparative studies, German municipalities have long been considered 
to have the greatest autonomy and the most significant scope of action. This was primarily 
because of the wide range of administrative functions that German municipalities are 
responsible for (Holtkamp 2007: 367; 2012: 150; Wollmann 2006: 435).  
The autonomy of German municipalities is based on the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
which guarantees municipalities the ‘right of self-government’. In constitutional terms, 
“municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own 
responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws. Within the limits of their functions 
designated by a law, associations of municipalities shall also have the right of self-
government according to the laws” (Basic Law, Article 28(2)). 
Traditional tasks of self-government can be divided into several types: Some of the allocated 
tasks are supervised from the federal states by means of instructions, such as the payment of 
social benefits and rent subsidies or the maintenance of a fire brigade. Other allocated tasks 
are not directed from above and the municipality is free to decide how to deal with them. 
Those tasks include the provision of electricity, gas, and water, waste disposal, the 
construction of schools and kindergartens or urban development plans.  
Moreover, there are voluntary activities, provided by municipalities at their own discretion 
and within their financial means. For example, municipalities can decide to build a new 
swimming pool or a new sports area, to buy new buses, to set up a museum etc. 
Municipalities are also in charge of regional business development. A major decision is how to 
distribute subsidies for cultural and social services (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 104; Walter-
Rogg/Kunz/Gabriel 2005: 415 ff., Wollmann 2012: 427ff.). 
Nearly all activities within the scope of responsibility of German municipalities belong to the 
task to provide (or ensure the provision of) public services. In general, public services are 
“provided by the government from taxes to be available to everyone” (Cambridge University 
Press 2008: 1146). In this dissertation the terms public services and services of general 
interest7 are used interchangeably to refer to the German concept of Daseinsvorsorge 
(Forsthoff 1958). This term has come to be used to refer to basic services that are necessary for 
everyone’s daily lives. These services encompass energy and water supply, waste 
management, public transportation and transport infrastructure, educational and cultural 
institutions, hospitals, and public housing (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 104, Münch 2006: 128ff.).  
Municipal steering possibilities vary across the different areas of public services, but room for 
manoeuvre is generally highest among the voluntary services, which also include climate 
                                                 
7 The term ‘services of general interest’ has been framed by the EU; cf. Treaty of Lisbon, Article 14 TFEU and Protocol Nr. 26 on Services of General Interest as 
well as the White Paper on services of general interest (European Commission 2004, see also Wollmann 2012: 434). 
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protection measures. In other words, municipalities have the freedom, within the limits of 
financial possibilities, to choose whether to become active in climate protection and to 
decide how such measures should be implemented (Difu 2011: 11). 
Despite their far-reaching autonomy, German municipalities are facing several challenges 
that affect their right to self-government, their scope of functions, and their room for 
manoeuvre. Two strands of research which focus on these issues are examined below: local 
government research and European multi-level governance. 
 
3.2 Three Major Challenges for the Local Government 
 
Political scientists working on local government issues assume that three major 
developments led to a decline of room for manoeuvre for local governments since the 1990s. 
These trends are EU-liberalisation, NPM and the budgetary crisis which all render 
privatisations more likely.8 Early analyses were shaped in particular by the work of Wollmann 
(2002; 2004) as well as Libbe, Tomerius, and Trapp (2002; 2004). Nevertheless, their arguments 
are still valid (cf. Libbe 2008: 26; Bogumil/Jann 2009: 193f.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 179ff.), 
even though NPM is now weakened by a slight trend towards remunicipalisation (Libbe et al. 
2011; Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013). 
 
3.2.1 EU‐Liberalisation 
 
The first trend, liberalisation, describes the idea to promote competition and enhance 
competitiveness through appropriate framework conditions. In the EU, this process is closely 
linked to the process of European integration: The development of the Single European 
Market (SEM) was largely based on the principle of implementing an EU-wide competitive 
market order (Sack 2006: 26). The implementation of the SEM by 1992 made the free 
movement of people, goods, services, and capital a top priority of the EU 
(Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 167). Cities and municipalities were first affected by SEM 
regulations that had an impact on the traditionally protected ‘local markets’ including, in 
particular, the provision of energy supply, waste treatment, and public transport (Wollmann 
2002: 32ff.; 2006: 438). Cross-sector regulations concerning state aid rules and the compulsory 
EU-wide tender process for public contracts (i.e. public procurement) are further 
characteristics of EU liberalisation (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 249f.). As the energy sector is the most 
frequently used example in this context, it is briefly outlined below. 
In 1996 the EU started to intervene in the electricity sector with a first directive (96/92/EC) that 
was followed by another directive (2003/54/EC) which is often referred to as acceleration 
directive. The latter directive introduced the unbundling of the following three key functions 
in energy provision: generation, transmission, and distribution/supply. The basic idea was to 
ensure price competition and non-discriminatory access to the transmission networks for all 
providers. Moreover, the directive obliged member states to establish a national regulatory 
agency (Wollmann 2013: 11).  
                                                 
8 The 1990s have also witnessed more ‘traditional’ reforms of municipal constitutions, territorial reforms and the introduction of direct elections of the 
mayor in most federal states (Wollmann 2006: 436f.; Bogumil/Jann 2009: 193ff.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 78f., 158ff.). Furthermore, cooperative elements of 
democracy such as the local Agenda 21 process gained importance (Bogumil/Jann 2009 193f.). Some authors mention globalisation as another trend that generally 
limits governmental scope of action at several political levels (Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 150; Libbe et al. 2004: 13). 
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In Germany, the 1998 Federal Energy Act aimed to transpose Directive 96/92/EC into national 
law. In the first phase, this legislation had the somewhat paradoxical effect of triggering 
several mergers of companies that resulted in the emergence of the so-called ‘Big Four’ (E.on, 
RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) which dominate the German energy market. Meanwhile, lots of 
municipalities saw themselves obliged to sell local grids and shares of their municipal utilities 
to the ‘Big Four’ because of competitive pressure and growing financial distress (Sack 2006: 
26; Wollmann 2013: 13).  
To conclude, EU internal market liberalisation restricts the wide scope of functions that had 
been previously available to municipalities. Critics of liberalised markets also fear a ‘race to 
the bottom’ of environmental standards and a lack of climate protection efforts 
(Bogumil/Jann 2009: 251). Münch (2006: 24f.; 73, 75) explains that the EU constrains local self-
government in three ways: first, by reducing municipalities’ freedom of action and choice; 
second, by withdrawing competencies; and, third, by creating new dependencies through 
control mechanisms. According to Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2013: 43) the distribution of 
funds under the framework of EU cohesion and regional policy can only partially limit this 
trend. 
 
3.2.2 New Public Management 
 
While similar discussions had been prominent on the international level already in the 1980s 
(Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 111), a reform concept for administrative procedures in Germany 
was only developed in the early 1990s9. This concept, called “Neues Steuerungsmodell” 
(Banner 1991), the German type of NPM, was based on experiences of the Dutch city of 
Tilburg and brought a change in the dominant understanding of the desirable administrative 
structures (Libbe et al. 2004: 44f.; Sack 2006: 31). The idea was to modernise the public sector, 
turn it into a public service provider with customer focus, enhance efficiency, and reduce 
costs.  
The basic assumption of NPM states that the internal modernisation of administrations in 
terms of market-oriented management and competition principles leads to greater cost-
efficiency without having any negative side-effects on other objectives and considerations of 
the public sector. To implement these ideas, large bureaucracies should, for instance, be 
divided into several smaller, rather autonomous units with their own budget 
(decentralisation). Along with performance management, this should not only lead to a 
competition between the different public agencies, but also between public agencies and 
private firms (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 237ff.; Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 208ff.)  
The traditional administration was also criticised for its ‘political rationality’ which was said to 
neglect economic efficiency while emphasising social, ecological, and other objectives in the 
public interest (Wollmann 2013: 3f., 9). Thus, NPM proponents argued for a clear separation of 
policy-making and strategic control on the one hand and service delivery on the other 
(Bogumil/Jann 2009: 240; Sack 2006: 31). All in all, the ‘enabling’ role of the state was 
emphasised while the provision of services was at least partially delegated to non-public 
actors (e.g. by contracting or privatisation) (Wollmann 2006: 437). 
 
                                                 
9 The concept was developed by the Municipal Association for Administration Management (Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für 
Verwaltungsmanagement) (Wollmann 2012: 433). 
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3.2.3 Budgetary Crises of Local Government 
 
In 2006, Wollmann (2006: 438f.) referred to the budgetary crisis at that time as the biggest 
challenge and threat to the German model of local self-government (see also Wollmann 2012: 
437). Since the early 1990s, local governments have increasingly suffered from budgetary 
crises, because economic slowdown resulted in a loss in revenue, while expenditures 
increased due to higher unemployment rates. Moreover, the federal and the state 
governments have significantly contributed to the crisis with certain structural fiscal policy 
decisions. For instance, they shifted tasks to the local level without any financial 
compensation. A current example of this is the provision of daycare for children under the 
age of three years (Holtkamp 2012: 148f.; Junkernheinrich 2010: 5).  
2003 constituted the peak of the crisis for local government finances which exhibited a severe 
deficit (Holtkamp 2012: 145). After a few years, which allowed municipalities to generate 
surpluses, the international financial crisis led to a further worsening of the situation in 2009 
(Junkernheinrich 2010: 4). The major problem are so-called “Kassenkredite”, short-term loans 
to public-sector institutions which are comparable to overdraft facilities. Until 2009, these 
loans have increased nearly sixfold in ten years (Holtkamp 2012: 147). In 2012, the short term 
loans added up to 47.5 billion Euros, which indicates that income and expenditures diverge 
increasingly (Deutscher Städtetag 2013: 8; Holtkamp 2012: 147). 
Consolidation pressure can restrict local self-government significantly, for instance, through 
the dependence on directed state allocations and the intervention by the state in the 
supervision of local authorities (Kommunalaufsicht)10. At the local level, it is therefore not 
possible to accrue a municipal budget deficit at the expense of future governments; instead 
political actors (i.e. local authorities) have immediately reduced freedom of action 
(Bogumil/Holtkamp 2004: 150; Holtkamp 2012: 147f.). Financial plight therefore puts local 
governments under considerable pressure to adjust and pushes them into selling municipal 
assets and enterprises (Wollmann 2006: 438f.). 
In addition, there is a link between demographic change and local government finances: 
demographic change11 induces rising average costs in the provision of social and technical 
infrastructure and the growth of welfare expenses due to the ageing society (Libbe et al. 
2004: 13, 39). Already from 2002 to 2008, social expenditure increased by almost 40 percent. 
As social services are mandatory tasks of local government, this strongly restricts municipal 
financial resources (Holtkamp 2012: 151).  
Thus, there is a general trend that the financial share of voluntary tasks of self-management 
decreases and reductions in staff have been highest in this sector (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 105; 
Wollmann 2012: 431f.). The question arises: what remains of local self-government if 
voluntary tasks are cut further? In any case, these savings cannot close the budgetary gap 
anymore: In many towns and cities, the cash advances are already higher than the spending 
on voluntary tasks (Junkernheinrich 2010: 5). 
 
                                                 
10 An instrument that considerably reduces municipal room for manoeuvre is the emergency budget (Nothaushalt). It replaces ordinary budget plans of 
highly indebted municipalities if the municipal budget security concept is not approved by the next higher authoritative level. In this case, the higher level 
determines the budget. In particular, municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia are concerned (Holtkamp 2012:159ff.). Even though Bremerhaven witnesses 
continuous budgetary crises, the budget for 2014/15 has been approved by the Bremen Senate in February 2014 (Senatorin für Finanzen 2014: 7ff.). 
11 This process has its origins in the early 1970s with a strong decline in birth rates. The phenomenon of shrinking cities has already existed in 
(West)Germany since the mid-1980s in regions with old and ‘dying’ industries like coal, steel, and shipbuilding (Ruhr District, Saarland, Bremen). Demographic 
change affects almost all areas of local policy. It is therefore a central framework condition for local authority action today and increasingly in the future (Libbe et 
al. 2004: 35ff.). 
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3.2.4 Consequences for Municipal Room for Manoeuvre 
 
As a result of the three major developments explained above, a significant trend towards 
privatisation could be observed in the mid-1990s. Since then, all federal governments have 
pursued privatisation-friendly policies (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 179)  
Privatisation describes the process of transferring the delivery of public services to 
organisations that have an economic interest to maximise profits. It is possible to differentiate 
between (1) formally (or organisationally) privatised organisations (e.g. organisations with a 
private legal status, but in public ownership), (2) functional privatisation (i.e. the 
transfer/delegation of tasks for a limited period of time – concession), and (3) material 
privatisation (i.e. the entire or partial sale) (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2013: 168f., Wollmann 2013: 
3).  
Most municipalities have focused on formal privatisations. Thus, about half of the municipal 
staff is now employed in outsourced municipal businesses. Around 75 percent of those 
businesses are companies with limited liability (GmbHs – Ltds). Taking all private legal forms 
of local operations together (GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG, AG, GbR and others), the share of 
privatised municipal shareholdings is over 80 percent in municipalities with a population of 
more than 50,000 inhabitants. The energy sector has witnessed the highest percentage of 
privatisations. Less than a third of these companies is still 100 percent publicly owned 
(Kuhlmann/ Wollmann 2013: 180f.). 
Hence, non-state actors have become increasingly important for the fulfilment of public tasks. 
Those actors are normally guided by individual and organisational self-interest. This creates 
tensions between the logic of competitiveness on the one hand, and demands for orientation 
towards the common good and democratic control of public service provision on the other. 
As a result, public interests are at risk of being marginalised (Sack 2006: 31; Wollmann 2006: 
446). The question arises how decentralised unities, often in legal forms of enterprises and 
sometimes even in private ownership, can be coordinated with regards to political aims that 
do not follow the economic rationale? 
Political scientists agree on a rather negative assessment of steering possibilities for municipal 
authorities. For example, Bogumil (2006: 11) and Wollmann (2006: 438) state that privatisation 
measures have led to a decisive loss of influence and control of politically legitimated 
municipal bodies. This includes even formal privatisation and public-private partnership 
(PPP), which means that actors operate outside the institutionally-established political and 
administrative structures of traditional local self-government. Kuhlmann (2006: 97f.) even 
states that the existing control vacuum and coordination gaps are proven by an almost 
complete absence of strategic political steering or mere steering concepts in cities using out-
sourcing strategies. According to Sack (2006: 31ff.) this is due to several difficulties that occur 
with regard to the obligation to define clear objectives and detailed service descriptions in 
advance of the allocation of responsibilities, the drafting of contracts and contract 
negotiations, the complex coordination of different organisational units in public service 
provision, and the controlling of a growing number of different actors. 
Most analysts therefore come to the conclusion that pluralisation of actors and 
decentralisation of tasks lead to a sectoral fragmentation of municipal tasks and, as a result, to 
the disintegration of cities’ administrations (Bogumil/Jann 2009: 245; Kuhlmann 2006: 97). 
Bogumil summarises the developments very pointedly: “There is a barely coordinated 
coexistence of a partially decentralised core administration without central controlling but 
with municipal enterprises, of PPPs, elements of competition, negotiation systems, 
participation procedures, and forms of civil society coproduction. These structures are not 
 12 
transparent and it is unclear who will assume overall responsibility [...]. The loss of steering 
possibilities and the increasing pluralism of forms of control and organisation can be rather 
pointedly interpreted as a fragmentation of local self-government” (Bogumil 2006: 11; 
translation by the author). 
Particularly, local parliaments (i.e. the legislative power) face a reduction of their political 
influence as financial crisis and privatisations restrict traditional policy-making processes 
(Bogumil/Jann 2009: 194; Sack 2006: 25, 34).  
In answer to the loss of steering capacity, a debate on remunicipalisation12 emerged after the 
turn of the millennium (Libbe 2008: 26, Sack 2006: 37). While there are several reasons for 
remunicipalisation, the safeguarding of local influence and the recovery of political steering 
capacity are of high political salience for most municipalities (Libbe et al. 2011: 5; 
Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 76). Gerd Landsberg, general manager of the German Association of 
Towns and Municipalities, stresses that municipalities hope to regain political power by 
remunicipalisation to shape their urban development (Landsberg 2013: 84f.). In a study 
published in 2011, more than 80 percent of the interviewees stated that better targeted 
control and the preservation of local influence were the intended objectives of 
remunicipalisation. With the second highest value at nearly 75 percent interviewees hoped to 
generate additional revenues through remunicipalisation (Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 77).  
With regard to the empirical evidence, a real trend of remunicipalisation is only evident in the 
energy sector; this is especially the case where functional privatisation took place. Since 1998, 
a large number of concession contracts have been concluded that expire now or in the 
coming years. This opens a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984) to create new municipal 
utilities (Landsberg 2013: 83, 86; Libbe et al. 2011: 6ff., 12; Schaefer/Papenfuß 2013: 77f.; 
Wollmann 2013: 18). 
 
3.3 Municipalities in the European Multi‐level System 
3.3.1 The Concept of Multi‐level Governance 
 
The multi-level governance approach in EU integration theories became well-known through 
Hooghe and Marks’ influential book Multi-level governance and European integration (2001). 
However, within the context of the EU, Gary Marks first used the phrase ‘multi-level 
governance’ in his earlier work on the reform of EU structural funds and its implementation 
(Marks 1992; 1993). Marks argued that national governments lost control both to the supra-
national level, namely the Commission, and to local and regional governments which play an 
important role in the planning and implementation process. In this context, Marks added 
ideas from the policy networks approach to emphasise the growing role of non-state actors in 
decision-making and the emergence of territorially overarching public-private policy 
networks.  
This thesis draws further on the work by Bache and Flinders (2004b: 2ff.) who have the 
following understanding of multi-level governance: the multi-level perspective assumes that 
EU governance is characterised by an interdependence of territorial governments at the 
subnational, national, and European level and by a dispersion of authoritative decision-
making power from the national level both vertically, to supranational and sub-national 
institutions, and horizontally, to non-state actors.  
                                                 
12 For further information on the term ‘remunicipalisation’ and its definition see Libbe et al. 2011: 4f. 
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However, this is not the only way to understand multi-level governance. For example, it is 
possible to distinguish two contrasting multi-level governance approaches in the literature 
which highlight differing qualities of multi-level governance (Hooghe/Marks 2004)13. 
Moreover, multi-level governance can be used as an analytical tool or understood as a 
normative concept (Bache/Flinders 2004a: 195ff.)14. In addition, the concept is also discussed 
beyond EU studies (Bache/Flinders 2004b: 4). 
It should be noted that municipalities are often not considered as a policy-making level 
equivalent to the regional, the national, and the supranational levels. This is because they are 
neither an independent administrative level nor are they considered to be of the same 
political importance in the decision-making process (Rechlin 2004: 2, 15)15. Therefore, the 
number of political scientists that focus on German municipalities in multi-level governance is 
rather small (Rechlin 2004: 5; Münch/von Alemann 2006: 16)16. 
 
3.3.2 Impact on German Municipalities 
 
The following two assumptions of multi-level governance theorists have considerable 
influence on local municipalities. First, because political decision-making levels are closely 
interconnected, actors can and have to be proactive on several political levels at the same 
time. Second, due to the dispersion of authority, traditional hierarchical top-down 
governmental action is complemented by transnational horizontal cooperation at regional 
and local level as well as across levels. In addition, ‘soft’ steering instruments have gained in 
importance (Brunnengräber 2007:333f.)17. Having said that, the question arises as to whether 
these trends create mainly new opportunities or challenges for municipalities? Additionally, 
what are the limitations of ‘soft’ forms of governance?  
One major driver for ‘soft’ steering instruments constitutes the Lisbon Strategy that 
introduced the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). This coordination approach uses policy 
tools such as iterative, systematic comparison, through monitoring or benchmarking in order 
to shape the behaviour of governmental actors, relevant stakeholders, and civil society with 
the aim to encourage policy learning (Wallace 2010: 98f.).  
Moreover, the EU institutions increasingly engage in cooperation with civil society actors and 
other stakeholders (Münch 2006: 41). The Commission therefore often initiates networks of 
experts, stakeholders and/or civil society. It coordinates the dialogue among these actors, 
while national, regional or local actors are still responsible for the actual policy formulation 
and implementation. Declaratory commitments and other non-binding forms of ‘soft law’ 
have gained in importance as well (Wallace 2010: 99).  
The main problem with these ‘soft’ forms of governance is that they “diffuse and disperse 
political responsibilities among the relevant political actors” (Wallace 2010: 100) which makes 
it difficult to locate political ‘ownership’ and responsibility. For example, declaratory 
commitments and guidelines are often adopted outside the formal EU decision-making 
                                                 
13 Type I multi-level governance creates general-purpose jurisdictions with non-intersecting memberships at a limited number of levels and with 
jurisdictions at lower tiers nested into higher ones. In this view authority is relatively stable. Type II multi-level governance consists of task-specific jurisdictions 
focusing on particular policy problems. It describes governance as a complex, but quite flexible patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions 
(Hooghe/Marks 2004: 16ff.). 
14 Also, the single term ‘governance’ has variable meanings, e.g. it can be used as an analytical tool or as a normative concept (‘good governance’) 
(Benz/Dose 2010). 
15 See Münch 2006: 79ff. for a contrary opinion regarding the political importance. 
16 The anthology of Münch/von Alemann (2006) is one of the exceptions. 
17 The growing dependence of municipalities on ‘soft’ forms of governance has also been recognised by Wollmann (2006: 446). 
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procedures and thus without participation of the legislative power, raising questions of 
political legitimacy and accountability. Furthermore, monitoring processes signify increased 
supervision and higher costs for municipalities (Rechlin 2004: 22). On the other hand, OMC 
offers cities possibilities to participate in the policy process.  
Within the European multi-level system, a growing number of EU directives and regulations 
affect the local scope of action. Examples for this are state aid rules, the obligation of public 
procurement, and environmental regulations (Münch 2006: 128ff.). EU legislation therefore 
constrains sub-national autonomy. What is more, decision-making power is primarily in the 
hands of the EU institutions and the member governments, while municipalities lack any 
institutional involvement. Therefore, municipalities can often only use informal channels of 
access and non-binding statements to articulate their interests (Rechlin 2004: 9ff). 
National channels of influence have always been important for German municipalities to 
shape policy, funding, and programme decisions. Local authorities' umbrella organisations 
play an important role in this process. Meanwhile, municipalities also need to lobby EU 
institutions to influence supranational decision-making (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 71; Rechlin 
2004: 7). Thus, local representation offices of the local authorities' umbrella organisations 
have been established in Brussels. But both the local authorities’ umbrella organisations and 
their Brussels offices often lack staff and financial resources, so they cannot act independently 
of their members (Münch 2006: 35). Overall local authorities are therefore still highly 
underrepresented compared to the German Länder. For example, municipalities only hold 
three out of the 24 German seats in the Committee of Regions (Frenz 2011: 373). 
Schultze (2003: 122f.) suggests that differences in size and regional significance of cities 
(including economic importance) are the major factors for determining whether a city has the 
capacity to become active in EU-related activities: “Getting involved in EU-projects or 
European networks demands a considerable investment in political commitment and human 
resources. Smaller cities often cannot or do not want to afford a European Affairs officer or a 
European Liaison Department so they often lack the necessary administrative and 
organizational capacity” (Schultze 2003: 123). Moreover, only major cities have sufficient 
political clout on the national and the European level to be identified as a ‘target group’ by 
the EU Commission (Schultze 2003: 136). 
The lack of resources is one reason why municipalities have a high incentive to seek collective 
interest representation through city networks or intermediary organisations. Moreover, the 
EU encourages transnational networks for good practice exchange and benchmarking of local 
policies and performances in local service delivery with ‘soft’ measures (Schultze 2003: 125). 
Thus, the major part of municipal European policy takes place in city networks and through 
umbrella organisations (Rechlin 2004: 8). For instance, Bremerhaven is member of the 
‘Climate Alliance’ which is a European network of local authorities committed to climate 
protection (Klima-Bündnis 2014)18. Yet, membership in networks and organisations implies a 
high level of coordination, an effort that represents another challenge for smaller 
municipalities (Rechlin 2004: 14). 
As most municipalities face financial crisis, European funds create new opportunities for local 
governments or facilitate, at least, scheduled projects (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 84). This is 
especially true since the financial resources of the EU’s structural policies have increased 
enormously since the establishment of its main instruments, the European Social Fund (ESF) 
and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), in the late 1950s and in 1975 
respectively (Schultze 2003: 126). With regards to cohesion policy, Hooghe and Marks (2001) 
                                                 
18 Betsill, Bulkeley, and Kern use a multi-level governance perspective to examine city networks, such as Climate Alliance, and cities’ climate policies (e.g. 
Betsill/Bulkeley 2005, 2007; Bulkeley/Kern 2009). 
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argue that the EU’s decision-making process increasingly involves authorities on the sub-
national level, bypassing central governments. Accordingly, Schultze (2003: 135ff.) shows that 
cities can and do participate in the initial phases (agenda-setting and policy-formulation) of 
the policy-making cycle with regard to the structural funds. They can also exert influence in 
other phases although to varying degrees. Thus, local governments have especially enhanced 
their socio-economic capabilities due to the EU’s regional policy (Fleurke/Willemse 2007: 71).  
Schultze concludes that “Europeanization and sub-national mobiliziation [sic!] has thus 
‘unlocked’ cities from the often rather hierarchical constraints of the national system by 
allowing them to build transnational coalitions, which suggests a careful re-labelling of cities 
as ‘policy makers’” (Schultze 2003: 137) in the European multi-level system.  
In conclusion, the relevant literature reveals ambiguous effects of the EU on sub-national 
authority. Sub-national decision-making in the EU multi-level system is enhanced and 
constrained at the same time. The large number of political interfaces signifies a particularly 
high need for coordination which is a major challenge for municipalities (Münch 2006: 35; 
Walter-Rogg/Kunz/Gabriel 2005: 454). However, Fleurke and Willemse (2007) show with the 
help of an empirical study conducted in two municipalities and one province in the 
Netherlands that the investigated municipalities are much more enhanced through EU-funds 
than constrained through EU-legislation.  
 
3.4 Bremerhaven: A Structurally Disadvantaged Maritime Port City 
 
The above-mentioned challenges are faced by all German municipalities. However, the local 
government of Bremerhaven faces particular structural problems that resulted in financial 
distress and make political steering even more difficult. 
Actually, Bremerhaven was once the largest continental European fishing port and a major 
centre for the ship building industry. However, the city has been extremely hit by structural 
crises and experienced a significant economic decline since the 1970s because of the 
restructuring of work processes in industries such as shipbuilding, fisheries and other 
traditional industrial sectors, which resulted in severe job cuts (Becker et al. 2013: 19ff.). By 
2010, nearly 92 percent of all jobs in the shipbuilding industry had been cut (Salot 2011: 5).  
Moreover, the US Army was stationed in Bremerhaven, but in 1992/93 the last 3,000 soldiers 
left the city together with their families. As a result, the purchasing power in Bremerhaven 
strongly decreased and further jobs were lost, including 30 percent of all jobs in the retail 
sector alone (Salot 2011: 5). The significant structural change which took place over a period 
of more than ten years led to a decrease in employment by nearly 20 percent. The number of 
inhabitants decreased by 10 percent until 2005 and the city experienced a persistent pattern 
of above-average levels of unemployment, with a peak of 26 percent in 2005 (Salot 2011: 6). 
Findings of recent studies using cluster analysis (soeb2 in 2009, Wegweiser Kommune in 
2012, Zukunftsatlas 2013) conclude that Bremerhaven is part of the cluster of severely 
underprivileged and most rapidly shrinking municipalities in Germany. These cities are 
characterised by population losses and an above-average share of elderly citizens, extremely 
high underemployment rates, and a very high percentage of recipients of basic 
unemployment benefits according to Book II of the German Social Security Code 
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(Sozialgesetzbuch II – SGB II)19 (Neu 2012a, b; Wegweiser Kommune 2012; Prognos AG 2013).  
Yet, in recent times, the labour market in Bremerhaven witnessed some positive 
developments: In the period from 2000 to 2011, the employment rate increased by about 10.5 
percent. At the same time, the German average growth rate amounted to only 4.5 percent 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2012). This trend continued in 2012 with an 
increase of 1.4 percent compared to 2011 (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2013b). In 2012, 
the unemployment rate dropped to 16.4 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2014). 
Moreover, the city’s population grew by 1.34 percent to 113,137 inhabitants in 2012. This is 
the first population increase since 2002 (Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2013a). 
The positive development of the labour market resulted at least partially from specifically 
targeted public investments. These enabled Bremerhaven to become an important location 
for polar and marine research and the city was able to attract major investments for the 
production of offshore wind turbines (Becker et al. 2013: 30ff., Salot 2011: 8ff.). This success 
suggests that the local government might also be able to achieve its climate policy objectives 
within the framework of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven. 
                                                 
19 SGB II unemployment benefits belong to a basic benefit scheme with low benefits in comparison to full unemployment benefits (under SGB III). 
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4. The Project Klimastadt Bremerhaven 
 
Mr Scherzinger from the Office of Environmental Protection called the brand name Klimastadt 
an ‘unbeatable concept’ (interview 14.02.14). But is the local authority actually able to expand 
its scope of action in climate policies or to develop new spheres of activity due to the 
Klimastadt Bremerhaven project? 
First, this chapter introduces three regional and local climate policy framework programmes 
to explain the local framework conditions for the Klimastadt project. After the analysis of 
these framework programmes and their importance for political steering, this section 
concentrates on the political process that established the project and the actors involved.  
 
4.1 Relevant Regional and Local Political Programmes 
 
The Red-Green governments in Bremen and Bremerhaven chose climate protection as a 
major action focus of their term of office (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 4; SPD und Bündnis 
90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 14). This commitment requires political framework programmes to 
coordinate the climate protection measures of the two cities and the city state. Anke Krein, 
City Councillor for Environmental Affairs until February 2014, called these programmes “our 
navigation instruments” (Krein 2012: 12). In other words, she talks about political steering 
instruments to achieve local climate policy objectives. 
For Bremerhaven, the relevant programmes are (1) the European Energy Award®, (2) the 
‘master plan active climate policy’, (3) the ‘climate protection and energy policy programme’ 
for Bremen and Bremerhaven (KEP 2020 – Klimaschutz- und Energieprogramm 2020), and (4) 
the ‘integrated climate protection concept’ (IKSK – Integriertes Klimaschutzkonzept), an 
initiative of the region Unterweser20. As the latter is still under development and does not yet 
provide any steering capacity, it will not be discussed in this thesis.  
 
4.1.1 European Energy Award 
 
The European Energy Award® (eea) is an instrument of self-governing and allows the local 
administration to present itself as a role model for climate-friendly behaviour in case of 
successful participation. As a quality management system and certification process, the eea 
allows the participating municipalities to systematically determine, assess, check, and 
coordinate all energy and climate protection activities of the local government to ensure their 
implementation. Today, the programme is used in 16 EU member states and Morocco.  
The eea is process-oriented and a long-term strategy. Its core element is a catalogue of 
around 100 measures which are divided into six fields of action. The implementation of the 
eea involves an Energy Team audit (internal audit) and an audit performed by an external 
expert; the latter is in charge of the certification. A municipality is awarded the European 
Energy Award®, if it meets at least 50 percent of the maximum possible points. If a 
                                                 
20 The region Unterweser includes the administrative districts of Cuxhaven and Wesermarsch (in Lower Saxony) as well as the city of Bremerhaven. For 
information on the IKSK see ARSU/RaUm 2012; 2013; Regionalforum Bremerhaven/ARSU/RaUm 2014. 
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municipality reaches 75 percent, it receives the European Energy Award® Gold (Forum 
European Energy Award e. V. 2014a, b; Klimastadtbüro 2012a).  
Bremen and Bremerhaven started the eea process in December 2005 (energiekonsens 2005). 
While Bremen was able to receive the European Energy Award® already in 2007, Bremerhaven 
did not obtain it until 2011 when it managed to achieve 61 percent (Krein 2012: 7). In the 
same year, Bremen was awarded the European Energy Award® Gold (Der Senator für Umwelt, 
Bau und Verkehr 2011b). According to Mr Becker, the city of Bremen does so well in the eea, 
because of the activities of the local climate protection agency energiekonsens21. He referred 
especially to the points on ‘communication and public relations’. This potential has not yet 
been fully utilised in Bremerhaven (Becker, interview 20.02.14). As a city-owned enterprise, 
Seestadt Immobilien22 is part of the eea monitoring and passes on the results of its in-house 
energy controlling each year. However, Mr Schneeberg does not see the eea as a control 
instrument, but only as a ‘feedback message’ about current projects and achieved building 
standards. He has the impression that whether it is a year or more until Bremerhaven achieves 
the gold status is not of the greatest importance to the city (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14). 
As Bremerhaven now intends to achieve the European Energy Award® Gold in 2015 
(Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14), it seems that Mr Schneebergs got the right impression. This 
also corresponds to the fact that monitoring processes are considered as ‘soft’ steering 
instruments. 
To conclude, the eea only allows steering of municipal actors and should thus be considered 
mainly as a tool to increase public awareness for the exemplary behaviour of Bremerhaven’s 
administration in terms of energy-efficiency and other climate-friendly measures. 
 
4.1.2 Master Plan Active Climate Policy 
 
In contrast to the European Energy Award®, the ‘master plan active climate policy’ is an 
instrument which allows the local government to define and include its own climate policy 
objectives (Krein 2012, Stadt Bremerhaven 2011). As a compendium of climate protection 
activities of the city of Bremerhaven, the ‘master plan’ could be seen as an umbrella strategy 
for an already existing variety of local state and non-state measures (Referat für Wirtschaft 
2010a). For instance, the ‘master plan’, which is continuously revised, comprised nearly 90 
detailed measures in its 2011 version (Stadt Bremerhaven 2011). Even though the ‘master 
plan’ puts emphasis on municipal-owned businesses, it also allows steering of non-state ac-
tors. Yet, this possibility only developed over time.  
The ‘master plan active climate policy’ has its origin in the ‘master plan active environmental 
policy’ which was commissioned by the parliamentary groups of the SPD and the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) in Bremerhaven in 2007. This ‘master plan’ was supposed to 
document all climate protection efforts of Bremerhaven. Therefore, it should include 
individual measures and their costs in the areas of climate-friendly energy policy, transport 
policy, planning and construction policy, measures to integrate business, schools, and higher 
education institutions in the city’s climate protection efforts, and measures that should be 
                                                 
21 energiekonsens is the non-profit and independent climate protection agency of the city state Bremen. It was established in the course of the 
privatisation of the Stadtwerke Bremen (public utilities) in May 1997 as a PPP. Shareholders are the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, the swb AG, as well as the EWE 
VERTRIEB GmbH. The agency is working towards the efficient use of energy and low-carbon energy production. energiekonsens therefore initiates and supports a 
variety of projects including information campaigns and advice services for different target groups ranging from households to companies and from construction 
workers to public institutions (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Bremer Energie-Konsens GmbH 2014a). 
22  Seestadt Immobilien was founded in January 2003 as an owner-operated enterprise of the city of Bremerhaven. The enterprise manages municipal 
buildings and properties such as administrative buildings, schools and kindergartens, museums, leisure and cultural facilities, and sports venues. Seestadt 
Immobilien has approximately 350 employees (Seestadt Immobilien 2009). 
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taken within the administration of Bremerhaven (SPD-Fraktion/CDU-Fraktion 2007). This 
means that the ‘master plan’ was intended to include all eea measures (self-governing) plus 
additional activities based on regulation, enabling or partnership.  
The motion was adopted unanimously in the local parliament of Bremerhaven on 7 February 
2008 (StVV 2008: 309). Subsequently, a cross-departmental working group was established in 
Department VI (environment and construction), which was responsible for the annual report 
and further development of the ‘master plan’. Its first meeting was held in September 2008 
(Bau- und Umweltausschuss 2008: 6).  
The increased importance of the ‘master plan’ manifested itself with its third report in 2011. 
First, a new local government was elected and the Greens entered a coalition with the SPD in 
July 2011. At the instigation of the Greens, the allocation of tasks changed and the 
Department VI was split into two departments with a new Environmental Department 
(Department IX) led by a green city councillor (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Kreisverband 
Bremerhaven 2011: 32; SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 13). The Environmental 
Department also took over the responsibility for the renamed ‘master plan active climate 
policy’ (Umweltschutzamt 2011a; 2011b).  
Secondly, the Environmental Committee unanimously adopted a binding target for the city of 
Bremerhaven to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 percent by 2020 on the initiative of the Greens23 
(governing by regulation). The party’s aim was to demonstrate Bremerhaven’s commitment 
to the objectives already set in KEP 2020. Moreover, the target allows the checking and even 
assessment and prioritisation of all local climate protection measures with regard to the 
reduction target (Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2011). Thus, the Office for Environmental 
Protection was given an instrument to represent its position more strongly and to 
legitimately demand other actors to take action (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). The great 
significance of this political mandate, stated by Mr Scherzinger, has proven to be true as all 
other interviewees declared to be committed to the 40 percent reduction target (Becker, 
interview 20.02.14; Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14; Lückehe, interview 04.03.14). 
Finally, the structure of the ‘master plan active climate policy’ was adjusted in 2011, so that it 
can now serve as the local update (“Fortschreibung”) of the KEP 2020 (Umweltschutzamt 
2011a; 2011b). Every single update of the ‘master plan’ has to be adopted by the local 
parliament. However other local actors (such as the Nord-Süd-Forum which is a civil society 
actor) advice the local government on measures the city should include in the ‘master plan’ 
(Krein 2012: 2). An updated version of the ‘master plan’ is supposed to be published in 2014 
(Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
 
4.1.3 KEP 2020 
 
In contrast to the approach of the ‘master plan active climate policy’ which tried to develop 
an umbrella strategy for an already existing variety of measures, the regional programme KEP 
2020 follows an approach from overall strategy to individual measures (Referat für Wirtschaft 
2010a). Similar to the ‘master plan’, it includes project areas that go beyond the traditional 
municipal scope of action outlined in chapter 3.1. 
On the initiative of the Red-Green coalition in Bremen, the Bremen Senate adopted an 
“Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2010” (action programme climate protection 2010) on 11 
                                                 
23 The binding target was adopted before the Greens entered the coalition government (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
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November 2008. This climate policy action programme comprised immediate measures to 
reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2010 (Bremische Bürgerschaft 2008)24. On the 
same day, the Senate commissioned the Senator for Environmental Affairs, Construction, 
Transport and Europe to work out an ambitious climate protection and energy policy 
programme covering the period up to 2020 (KEP 2020). Beforehand, the coalition parties had 
already agreed on such a programme in their coalition agreement of June 2007 (SPD 
Landesorganisation Bremen/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Landesverband Bremen 2007: 24ff). 
The programme was developed through a participatory process, in which citizens and 
relevant actors of business and civil society were invited to enter into a dialogue with the 
Environmental Senator. This dialogue took place in 2009, in the formally structured way of a 
series of four workshops that were based on the work of independent experts who calculated 
a reference and a climate protection scenario and suggested measures for the city state to 
adopt25. The local government of Bremerhaven directly contributed to the KEP 2020 with its 
‘master plan’ measures (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14)26. The programme KEP 2020 was 
then adopted by the Senate in December 2009.  
The main objective of the KEP 2020 is a binding CO2 reduction target for the city state: 40 
percent by 2020 compared to 199027. The climate protection scenario indicates that 
Bremerhaven could achieve the target while the forecast for Bremen is less optimistic (31.5 %) 
(BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010: 46). Moreover, the energy-intensive production of steel in 
Bremen is not yet part of the calculation. From 2005 to 2010, the steel industry accounted for 
around 42 percent of the CO2 emissions of the city state. The exact amount of CO2 emissions 
varies each year because the industry is highly dependent on economic trends. There is, as of 
yet, no clear downward trend to be observed, but emissions were comparably low in 2005, 
2006, and 2009 (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013: 14).  
The strategy paper KEP 2020 names concrete measures related to energy production and 
consumption, utilisation of heat, business and science, as well as transport and mobility to 
reach the reduction target and it includes the same modes of governing as the ‘master plan’. 
The individual measures include, for instance, the expansion of wind energy production by a 
factor 5, energy-focused building refurbishment of municipal buildings according to the 
Energy Saving Ordinance (EnEV), incentive programmes for private homeowners, information 
and advice services for companies and citizens provided by energiekonsens, the use of low-
emission vehicles in local public transport, or the promotion of walking and cycling, e.g. 
through traffic-calmed areas (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010). This enumeration already 
shows that projects do not only belong to the traditional tasks of local self-government 
presented earlier. 
Furthermore, the KEP 2020 includes a CO2 monitoring for the cities Bremen and Bremerhaven 
as well as for the city state. This monitoring is the central steering instrument for the KEP 2020 
and emphasises the importance of ‘soft’ steering instruments in accordance to the theoretical 
                                                 
24 In March 2011, the programme results were assessed: By the end of 2010 only 65 percent of the desired CO2 reduction was achieved. The full report is 
available at: http://www.umwelt.bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/ 
APK-Bilanz.pdf (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2011a). 
25 The expert team included members of the Büro für Energiewirtschaft und technische Planung GmbH (BET Aachen), the Bremer Energieinstitut (BEI), and 
the Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH. Their report can be accessed online: 
http://www.umwelt.bremen.de/sixcms/media.php/13/Endbericht_Langfassung 
_fin_28-06-10.pdf (BET/BEI/Wuppertal Institut 2010). 
26 Moreover, the whole process was – and still is – accompanied by a cross-departmental working group with eight members who ensure the consent of 
all senatorial departments. The working has two members from Bremerhaven: Mr Scherzinger for the Office for Environmental Protection and Mr Polansky for the 
Magistrate Chancellery. Meetings of the working group are not held on a regular basis, but whenever they are needed (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 
2014b). 
27 It should be noted that it was the Bremen Senate (i.e. executive authority) which adopted the KEP 2020 and its 40 % target, while in Bremerhaven the 
decision was taken by the local parliament (i.e. legislature). Yet, this is likely to change because the Bremen Senate introduced a bill for a climate protection law in 
March 2014. This law would incorporate the KEP 2020 measures and the CO2 monitoring (Gerling/Michel 2014; Schnase 2014). 
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assumptions of the multi-level governance approach. It allows for the periodic review of 
progress made towards meeting the CO2 reduction target.  
The monitoring also includes non-state actors such as the STÄWOG28 (and other housing 
associations) or energiekonsens which implies in case of the latter increased municipal 
influence in areas that have not been traditional areas of municipal responsibility. Mr Becker 
in particular pointed out that the Environmental Senator, who is the chairman of the 
supervisory board of energiekonsens, increasingly requests measureable results of all 
institutions involved to feed accurate figures into the KEP 2020 monitoring. Therefore, 
energiekonsens has to meet the challenge to quantify certain project results for the first time 
(Becker, interview 20.02.14). 
Data for the period 1990–2010 shows heterogeneous, partially opposing trends: the greatest 
success in reducing CO2 emissions in absolute and relative terms was achieved in the heat 
supply of buildings (- 35.5 % or around 760,000t)29, followed by reductions in the traffic sector 
(- 10 % or 163,000t). Conversely, emissions increased especially in the manufacturing industry 
(+ 80 % or ca. 260,000t). All in all, emissions decreased by 8.3 percent in the city state, yet 
Bremerhaven achieved a reduction by 10.7 percent. In total, the state emitted 6.3 million t of 
CO2 in 2010 (11.6 million t with the steel industry). Bremerhaven accounted for around 14 
percent of those emissions, 900,000t (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013; Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 24).  
As mentioned above, the KEP 2020 is constantly developed further. Therefore, annual 
conferences are held to emphasise specific topics such as energy-efficient renovation or 
climate protection in businesses. Every second year the conference takes place in 
Bremerhaven (Freie Hansestadt Bremen 2010: 24; Scherzinger, 20.02.2014). 
The implementation of the KEP 2020 is supported by the ‘KEP 2020-Management’ along with 
three employees. Its task is to help decision-makers to transform the strategic objectives into 
concrete measures. The ‘KEP 2020-Management’ therefore coordinates climate protection 
activities, it is in charge of project controlling (project database etc.) and PR work (including 
the organisation of the KEP 2020 conferences). Another part of its work is the monitoring of 
CO2 emissions.  
Organisationally the ‘KEP 2020-Management’ is located in the Department for Energy and 
Environmental Technology with the Senator for Environmental Affairs, Construction, 
Transport and Europe (Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2014a). The ‘KEP 2020 
Management’ is subsidised through the so-called “Kommunalrichtlinie” (BMU 2013) which is 
an incentive programme of the National Climate Protection Initiative (Nationale 
Klimaschutzinitiative) of the Federal Environment Ministry (BMU). One day per week, the 
management works in its Bremerhaven office (Krein 2012). Bremerhaven wants to apply for 
funding for its own management based on the next update of the ‘master plan active climate 
policy’. Thus, the funding guidelines of the National Climate Protection Initiative influence the 
organisational structure of the Klimastadt project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
 
                                                 
28 The STÄWOG is the housing company of Bremerhaven. Its only shareholder is the city (formal privatisation). As a municipal company, the STÄWOG aims 
to promote the development of Bremerhaven on behalf of the city administration (Stäwog 2013: 2). Since its foundation in 1941, the corporate purpose of the 
STÄWOG is the socially responsible and affordable provision of housing for broad sections of the population. The provision of services for the city has become 
increasingly important in recent years (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).While the STÄWOG is a traditional housing company maintaining around 5200 flats, the 
subsidiary STÄGRUND manages special buildings such as the theatre and the buildings of the zoo. The subsidiary STÄPARK is in charge of parking lots and all other 
parking facilities (Schmidt 2013: 170ff.). The energy subsidiary STÄWOG Service GmbH operates block-type thermal power stations and photovoltaic systems. It also 
sells the electricity that is self-produced to the tenants (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, Schmidt 2013: 11, 166ff.).  
29  These are approximate values; see Der Senator für Umwelt, Bau und Verkehr 2013:15f. for a detailed explanation. 
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4.2 Klimastadt – From a First Idea to the Actual Project 
4.2.1 The Conceptual Study 
 
The whole Klimastadt Bremerhaven project started with a motion, tabled by the 
parliamentary groups of the SPD and the CDU on 27 September 2007. As a consequence, the 
local parliament unanimously requested the Magistrat to compile an R&D concept with the 
aim of allowing the already existing network of climate-related institutions to become a 
flagship project for Bremerhaven and to generate economic potential. The final study 
concluded that Bremerhaven has excellent prerequisites to promote itself as an 
internationally respected Klimastadt (AWI 2009). The term “Klimastadt” had thus emerged 
during the preparation of this concept (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
The initial idea was to turn the city into a centre for climate and climate-related research. The 
parliamentary motion further specified that the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), the University 
of Applied Sciences in Bremerhaven, and the science museum Klimahaus (‘climate house’) 
should be part of the concept and its development (StVV 2007: 125f.).  
As the municipal council has no competence in sciences, the Department for Economics 
commissioned the AWI to draw up the required concept (Klimastadtbüro 2014b). Two 
members of the AWI and an employee of the business-oriented BAW Institut für regionale 
Wirtschaftsforschung were in charge of the study. They worked in close cooperation with a 
15-member advisory board that accompanied the work. These actors mainly represented 
business interests and the political executive. Local citizens’ groups and/or NGOs were not 
involved (AWI 2009).  
The final conceptual study was published in December 2009. The study stated that promoting 
Bremerhaven as a Klimastadt requires close cooperation between politics, business and 
science not only within the city, but also in the city state and the region (Unterweser). 
Bremerhaven could thus stimulate climate mitigation and adaption as well as innovative 
structural change (AWI 2009). The study included the analysis of the current situation, future 
perspectives, and recommendations. It identified in particular three ‘climate lighthouses’ 
(„Klimaleuchttürme“) which could help to establish Bremerhaven as a well-known climate 
network and competence centre throughout Europe. These are: (1) regional business 
promotion in the offshore wind energy sector, (2) top-level, climate-related research activities, 
and (3) tourist attractions such as the Klimahaus. 
The conceptual study and its recommendations were discussed in the plenary session of the 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung in June 2010. On the whole, all parliamentary groups 
expressed approval and the conceptual study with its recommendations was accepted as a 
starting point for the R&D development strategy called “Klimastadt Bremerhaven” (StVV 
2010a: 12ff.). However, the concept was criticised by some, with the Greens especially 
criticising the focus on business (and science) and the neglect of municipal authorities’ and 
citizens’ commitments30. According to the Greens, the term “Klimastadt” should not become a 
marketing tool, but a daily common practice. Therefore, citizen participation should be 
strengthened.  
                                                 
30 The conceptual study included one chapter on the city’s activities for which the municipal administration was taken on board. Apart from that the focus 
was only on R& D (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
 23 
Mayor Schulz (SPD) emphasised that the local parliament, the municipal authorities, and 
other public institutions should consider themselves as “the engine for further development” 
(StVV 2010a: 14; translation by the author). The local administration was instructed to propose 
an organisational structure for the implementation stage. At the same time, the local 
parliament also decided that the R&D strategy should be harmonised with the ‘master plan 
active climate policy’ and that both should be developed accordingly (StVV 2010a: 14). 
4.2.2 Implementing an Organisational Structure 
 
With the mission to implement the development strategy and to connect the different 
strands of climate-related initiatives (‘master plan’, R&D strategy), the local government had 
to work out a plan for the organisational and operative realisation of the project. In other 
words, the focus was now put on the distribution of tasks among the involved actors and the 
provision of the necessary financial resources. For this purpose, the Magistrat adopted a 
proposal in October 201031. The local parliament approved this proposal with an identical 
decision a week later (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a; StVV 2010b: 19ff.).  
The proposal of the Magistrat included the creation of an administrative office with two 
employees, the already established advisory board as a supervisory generator of ideas, and 
the establishment of a ‘virtual climate department’ to coordinate the activities of the city 
council32. As requested by the Stadtverordnetenversammlung, the advisory board was 
extended to include members of the local parliament, the city district conferences and also 
the Bremen Senate (as well as other institutions). Nevertheless, civil society and especially 
NGOs were still underrepresented. The resolution further proposed the following eight 
climate projects that were derived from the conceptual study: (1) collaborative projects 
business/science, (2) scientific infrastructure, (3) logistics/climate, (4) demonstration facilities, 
(5) events/marketing, (6) environmental protection, nature conversation and urban 
development, (7) citizens and schools, and (8) sustainable tourism. For each of those projects 
the Department for Economics suggested a lead institution.  
Finance was supposed to be mainly provided by ERDF funding from the Bremen priority area 
2.3 – Enhancing the Image of the Cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven. Correspondingly, the 
Bremerhaven Association for Investment and Urban Development (BIS) was instructed to 
create a marketing concept (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a).  
Already in January 2011, Prof. Dr. Schulz-Baldes33 was employed as the project coordinator by 
the city via a consultancy contract with the BIS (Referat für Wirtschaft 2011). The next 
important events took place several months later. In Mai 2011, the Department for Economics 
reported on the progress to implement an organisational structure for the project. In this 
process, the issue of finance had emerged as the main problem. The Bremen Senate refused 
to spend ERDF money for one employee of the not yet established administrative office for 
the Klimastadt and to pay for the activities of the project groups (e.g. the marketing concept 
or feasibility studies).  
After negotiations among the involved senators, the BIS, energiekonsens, and the 
Department for Economics, Bremerhaven was despite its financial constraints able to 
establish an administrative Climate City Office (“Klimastadtbüro”) in mid-2011. The office was 
                                                 
31 In an additional statement to this proposal of October 2010, the Department for Environment and Construction emphasised once again that the strategy 
Klimastadt Bremerhaven was only a strategic flagship programme with a focus on R&D, but without any binding impact (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a: 7). 
32 The ‘virtual climate department’ consists of one employee of the Department for Economics, Mrs Claudia Harms, and one person working at the Office for 
Environmental Protection, Mr Till Scherzinger (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; Stadt Bremerhaven 2014b). See also section 4.3. 
33 Key actors of the Klimastadt project are described/characterised in section 4.3. 
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located in the so-called KLIMA*HAVEN, an office shared with energiekonsens and the ‘KEP 
2020-Management’. While energiekonsens paid for the common meeting room, 
photocopiers, and the data network, Bremerhaven covered the cost for the remaining rent 
and other expenditure. The payment of one employee was facilitated by the Environmental 
Senator (who covered 50 % of the costs i.e. 20 hours per week) and energiekonsens (which 
covered 10 hours per week) (Referat für Wirtschaft 2011: 2; Umweltschutzamt/Referat für 
Wirtschaft 2013: 4). The Financial and Economic Committee of the local parliament approved 
the decisions by the Magistrat in November 2011 (Finanz- und Wirtschaftsausschuss 2011). 
In December 2010, the conceptual study was first presented to the public (Umweltschutzamt 
2012). Subsequently, the term “Klimastadt” experienced considerable societal approval in the 
first half of 2011. However, people associated a rather broad understanding of a climate-
friendly city with the term, in contrast to the narrow understanding of the conceptual study 
that had focused on an R&D strategy and location marketing for renewable energies, 
especially the offshore wind energy. Civil society in Bremerhaven expressed a clear demand 
for a comprehensive climate protection concept and a development strategy that would 
encompass the whole urban community (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; Umweltschutzamt 
2012). It was this societal understanding of the term that prevailed after the local elections in 
Mai 2011. These elections brought a significant political change to Bremerhaven. After 12 
years of grand coalition government (Probst 2011: 123ff.), a Red-Green coalition came to 
power. The participation of the Greens in a coalition government implied a shift in focus of 
the Klimastadt project towards a comprehensive, societal climate protection strategy.  
While the term “Klimastadt” appeared in the election programme of the SPD under the 
headings of maritime tourism, public transport, and the aim to become a leading industrial 
site for renewable energies (SPD – Unterbezirk Bremerhaven 2011: 5, 21), the Greens stated in 
their election programme the impression that the grand coalition (SPD – CDU) had promoted 
climate initiatives only half-heartedly and with the aim of enhancing the city’s image or to 
acquire money. The Green party emphasised that it would focus more strongly on the 
participation of local initiatives, associations, and individual citizens instead (Bündnis 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN Kreisverband Bremerhaven 2011: 32).  
Moreover, the Greens introduced the idea to use the Klimastadt project as a coordination 
mechanism to ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors were consistent and 
coherent as well as in line with political objectives. In their election programme, they 
described the ‘R&D network Klimastadt’ as an excellent instrument to develop and implement 
concrete projects within this framework, to make use of the existing scientific knowledge and 
to integrate those competences in the political work (Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN Kreisverband 
Bremerhaven 2011: 32).  
Apparently, the Green party managed to get the SPD to agree to its view on the concept 
Klimastadt during the coalition agreement negotiations. Already the preamble of the 
coalition agreement states: “We will advance an ecological reconstruction of the urban 
society under the objective Klimastadt Bremerhaven. For us, this includes the citizens as well 
as business, research, traffic, but also the quality of life and conditions for visitors in this city” 
(SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 3; translation by the author). Furthermore, the 
coalition agreement included a whole paragraph just on the Klimastadt. The two parties 
agreed that the term “Klimastadt” was more than a label related to the museum Klimahaus or 
offshore wind energy. Instead, the project should include all climate change mitigation and 
adaptation measures, such as in the areas of energy consumption and production, 
refurbishment of old buildings, and public transportation. The paragraph on the Klimastadt 
even dealt with green areas in the city.  
The coalition agreement is also a sign that ecological modernisation perspectives have not 
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only been a major influence on policy-making at the national level, but also at the local level, 
e.g. the coalition agreement states that the coalition parties understand the structural change 
in Bremerhaven as one element of an “ecological and economic reconstruction of the 
economy” (SPD und Bündnis 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2011: 4).  
To conclude, the previous findings suggest that the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven is indeed 
a political instrument or coordination mechanism used by the municipality to ensure that 
climate protection measures taken by various actors are consistent and coherent. Thus, the 
first part of the hypothesis can already be confirmed. 
 
4.2.3 Setting Course for Klimastadt Bremerhaven 
 
With a project coordinator and manager in place and a newly elected local government, the 
city of Bremerhaven was finally able to start moving towards its vision of a Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven in 2012. First of all, this meant the restructuring of the originally planned 
organisational structure. The main reason for this was the overstretch of the involved actors 
or an ‘actor cannibalism’ as Scherzinger (interview 14.2.14) has called it. From 2010 to 2012, 
the different strands of climate protection activities (municipal, regional, conceptual study) 
had created direct competition for project participants with a large number of events. 
Therefore, political decisions were taken to concentrate responsibility for all climate 
protection activities in the hands of municipal actors, after attempts to reach consensus had 
failed (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
The advisory board met for the last time in December 2011. It was abandoned because it had 
too many members (> 40), which made political steering impossible (Scherzinger, interview 
14.02.14). Subsequently, a steering group for climate policies was created by the Office for 
Environmental Protection with members of the Environmental Department, the Department 
for Economics, the administrative office of the Klimastadt (programme manager and 
coordinator) as well as the project groups (Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4).  
Moreover, the city had to define what the term “Klimastadt” meant, as the understanding of 
the term had already been misunderstood and caused some confusion. The aim was to 
establish the Klimastadt Bremerhaven as a local identifying feature in the long run. Therefore, 
a participatory process was started to create a declaratory commitment (a mission statement) 
for the future. It was the first time in the process that citizens could actually participate. The 
Institut für Informationsmanagement GmbH (ifib) in Bremen cooperated with the city of 
Bremerhaven to provide a website for an online consultation and the ifib also evaluated the 
participatory process as part of a German Research Foundation (DFG) project34. The Office for 
Environmental Protection opened a hotline for citizens without internet access who were able 
to submit suggestions in person during office hours (Umweltschutzamt 2012). 
As of 18 January 2012, citizens discussed their views about the Klimastadt project under the 
following main guiding questions: “What is a climate city?”, “How do we become a climate 
city?” and “How do we measure the success?”35 Hence, a ‘catalogue’ was created to serve as a 
guideline and support for local decision-makers on the road to becoming the Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven. The whole participatory procedure was completed with a final presentation 
and discussion of the results on 22 May 2012 (Scherzinger 2012; Stadt Bremerhaven 2014a). 
                                                 
34 For further information on the project, called “e2democracy“, see: http://www.e2democracy.eu/content/sections/index.cfm/secid.1/secid2.0/lang.1 (ifib 
2014). 
35 After six weeks, the Office for Environmental Protection pooled 264 ideas and 202 comments into packages for which citizens could vote. Those were 
presented in a public meeting on 19 March 2012. From 21 March to 17 April 2012, citizens were able to vote for their preferred package (Stadt Bremerhaven 2014a). 
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The mission statement (see introduction) confirms the change in focus of what was 
understood by the term “Klimastadt”36.  
On 8 October 2012, the website “Kurs Klimastadt Bremerhaven” was activated. It documents 
all projects of the Klimastadt initiative and allows citizens to comment on all posts on the 
website (Klimastadtbüro 2012b). 
The existing project groups went through a restructuring process as well, before they 
appointed spokespersons for the steering group. The reorganisation was shaped by the local 
perception of the problem climate change and the climate policy objectives set out in the 
‘master plan’ and the KEP 2020 (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). In early 2014, there were six 
working groups, each responsible for projects in one thematic area of action, although all 
projects are supposed to contribute to a consistent, sustainable cityscape. The following three 
working groups still have the name proposed by the municipal council in 2010: (1) 
collaborative projects business/sciences, (2) citizens and schools, and (3) sustainable tourism. 
Moreover, there is the (4) communications working group, (5) the group on e-mobility and (6) 
the group focusing on construction and remediation (Klimastadtbüro 2014a, 
Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4f.). 
Meanwhile, the city has also provided a basic financial foundation for the process. In 2012 and 
2013, the environmental budget included € 70,000 for the Klimastadt working groups. In 2014 
and 2015, there will be a budget of € 200,000 for the Klimastadt. Moreover, Bremerhaven’ 
share from “BINGO - Die Umwelt Lotterie” (‘environmental lottery’) will be allocated to the 
project groups (ca. € 60,000/year) following a motion by the Greens.  
On the initiative of the Environmental Councillor, a new Climate City Office was established at 
the beginning of 2014. It unites all actors of the Klimastadt process in one organisational unit 
including those working on issues of climate protection oriented public services, the sectoral 
development of the economic structure, and civil society commitment. In the long-run, this 
office should include two employees of the Office of Environmental Protection, two ‘KEP 
2020-Managers’, the Klimastadt coordinator, its manager, one apprentice, one office 
employee (part-time), and one research assistant (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; 
Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4ff.).  
4.3 Key Actors of the Klimastadt Project 
 
This section provides a more detailed assessment of the roles of the key actors of the 
Klimastadt37. It explains how non-state actors are integrated in the organisational structure of 
the Klimastadt, it identifies opportunities for municipal steering and it points out where local 
government can open up new spheres of activity and/or room for manoeuvre. 
The Department IX (environment) is politically responsible for the Klimastadt project and the 
process of combining all climate protection activities in one comprehensive programme. It is 
led by an honorary councillor (Mrs Anke Krein from July 2011 to February 2014). The Office for 
Environmental Protection, which is subordinated to the Department IX, deals with issues of 
waste management, soil conservation, contaminated sites, nature conservation, forests, and 
water. It is also in charge of the eea quality management and the updating of the ‘master plan 
active climate policy’. This also implies that it is the point of contact for the ‘KEP 2020-
Managers’ (Stadt Bremerhaven 2012). The Office for Environmental Protection considers itself 
                                                 
36 The change in focus of what was understood by the term “Klimastadt” becomes also visible, when two presentations of Mr Schulz-Baldes held in January 
and November 2012 are compared (Schulz-Baldes 2012a, b). 
37 An organisational chart with key actors is provided in annex II. 
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as a “lobbyist for the climate” (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). That implies, all of its activities 
are oriented towards the 40 percent reduction target.  
Since 2014, the Office for Environmental Protection is also officially responsible for climate 
protection and climate change adaptation (according to the municipal distribution of tasks). 
This allows it to act more forcefully within the administration and to legitimately claim the 
right to be consulted on all matters related to climate change. Mr Scherzinger explained: 
“Even if this new regulation is barely visible from outside the local administration, internally, 
this is significant progress for us, e.g. concerning the exact conditions of local financial 
incentive programmes related to climate protection measures” (Scherzinger, interview 
14.02.14; translation by the author). 
The BIS supports the Klimastadt project with money for the Climate City Office and 
programmes for environmental promotion in local businesses (‘green economy’38), as well as 
within its marketing strategy (BIS 2013: 6). The conceptual study assumed a leading role for 
the BIS (in addition to the Magistrat) (AWI 2009: 7ff.). Accordingly, the project management to 
implement the recommendations of the conceptual study has been carried out by the BIS. 
However, due to the project’s shift in focus, the BIS is now neither directly represented in the 
new Climate City Office nor in the steering group (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).  
 
4.3.1 The Climate City Office 
 
The new Climate City Office was established in the Environmental Department and under the 
supervision of the Environmental Councillor. It was created as a unit that would allow political 
steering of local government (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Mr Becker noticed that: “The 
city wanted to be better organised” (Becker, interview 20.02.14; translation by the author). 
The aim was to allow local climate policy considerations and the CO2 reduction target to 
influence and shape not only the provision of services of general interest but also civil society 
processes which are not part of the traditional municipal scope of functions 
(Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 1). The new institutional structure of the office 
also highlights its coordination function. 
The new Climate City Office includes the climate protection activities in the traditional 
municipal areas of action (such as public infrastructure and services of general interest) which 
usually have no direct economic benefit and the former administrative office of the 
Klimastadt which has its origins in the R&D study and could be seen as the civil 
society/business strand of the project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). While the traditional 
municipal sphere includes all self-governing activities of the Office for Environmental 
Protection and is shaped and developed by political decision-making, the civil 
society/business strand is where the local government opens up new spheres of activity and 
potential room for manoeuvre. 
The former administrative office of the Klimastadt includes the programme coordinator and 
its manager. The program coordinator, Prof. Dr. Meinhard Schulz-Baldes, is a marine biologist 
who worked at the AWI and later as a professor at the University of Bremen. Furthermore, he 
was General Secretary of the German Advisory Council on Global Change to the Federal 
Government (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010b). His task is to advise the working groups, to 
                                                 
38 ‘Green economy’ is defined by the UNEP as “one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental 
risks and ecological scarcities. In its simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive” 
(UNEP 2011: 16). Discussions around the concept of ‘green economy’ build in many ways on previous discourses, particularly discourses about ecological 
modernisation (Volkery/Rouabhi undated: 2, 6). The German federal government launched a ‘green economy’ initiative in 2012 (BMBF 2012). 
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generally coordinate all projects and to take forward their implementation. More-over, he 
represents the Klimastadt mainly through presentations and speeches as well as lobbying (BIS 
2013: 6; Stadt Bremerhaven 2012).  
The Klimastadt Bremerhaven project is managed by biologist Marc Liedke (Bremer Energie-
Konsens GmbH 2014b, Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4). He coordinates the 
project groups and organises the external presentation in the media, e.g. he maintains the 
website (Stadt Bremerhaven 2012). In future, a new task for Mr Liedke could be to recruit and 
support businesses and companies that are willing to act as frontrunners of a ‘green 
economy’ in Bremerhaven. This plan was developed by the Environmental Department 
together with the BIS to strengthen the competitiveness of local companies 
(Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 6).  
The civil society/business strand allows no top-down steering. In contrast to the traditional 
municipal sphere, where the local government can directly control actions, political decision-
making does not directly shape the work of the project groups that are administered and 
coordinated by Schulz-Baldes and Liedke. The collaboration of actors in the groups takes 
place on a voluntary basis through partnership and enabling. All action is therefore based on 
acceptance of the municipal procedures. Companies especially do not accept any 
predetermination regarding detailed project designs (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
Yet, to exert a certain authority vis-à-vis the former administrative office, Mr Liedke became 
an employee of the administration in April 2014 when he left his office in the KLIMA*HAVEN 
(Becker, interview 20.02.14). As an employee of the administration, new avenues open up for 
Mr Liedke inside local government. For instance, he is now authorised to write draft 
resolutions. On the other hand, he is subordinated to Mr Scherzinger which increases 
municipal influence on the former administrative office (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
 
4.3.2 The Steering Group for Climate Policies 
 
The establishment of the steering group for climate policies was another attempt to enhance 
political steering capacity and thus increase political room for manoeuvre. Mr Scherzinger 
described the steering group as a coordination body that should allow the introduction of 
municipal climate policy objectives into the Klimastadt process through partnership. It can be 
seen as “the interface between local government and the project groups of the Klimastadt” 
(Umweltschutzamt/Referat für Wirtschaft 2013: 4, translated by the author, emphasis added). 
Though, it should be noted that the steering group is still in an orientation phase, and 
according to Mr Becker, it operates very much on the principle of ‘learning by doing’ (Becker, 
interview 20.02.14).  
The following two departments of the Magistrat are represented in the steering group: the 
Environmental Department and the Department for Economics. They form the ‘virtual climate 
department’ to ensure the implementation of the R&D strategy (that was under responsibility 
of the Department for Economics) as well as the eea and the ‘master plan active climate 
policy’ (under responsibility of the Environmental Department). The ‘virtual climate 
department’ therefore was a tool to facilitate a consistent external communication and to 
ensure that the strategies and all measures were well coordinated with the region and the 
state (Referat für Wirtschaft 2010a: 2, Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Thereby, the ‘virtual 
climate department’ functioned as an interface between the local government and the 
administrative office of the Klimastadt (Klimastadtbüro 2014b). Now, the new Climate City 
Office combines these two strands. However, the ‘virtual climate department’ is not yet 
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outdated, because the Department for Economics provides knowledge about and access to 
funding pools such as the ERDF (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
The spokespersons from each of the working groups in the steering group shall promote 
exchange and networking among the groups. The steering group mainly discusses and 
recommends specific projects for funding. Thereby, the steering group is supposed to lead to 
transparent decision-making and to resolve the competition of project proposals. Decisions 
are taken on the basis of proposals with the obligatory objective to contribute to the 40 
percent CO2 reduction target in some way39. According to Mr Scherzinger, financial 
incentives, which belong to governing through enabling, are crucial for the participation of 
business in the Klimastadt project40. The allocation of funds through the participation of the 
steering group signifies a partial integration of the voluntary working groups into the city’s 
administrative procedures (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).  
                                                 
39 The money is released by the Environmental Department. Up to now, individual projects received € 5,000–20,000. To provide a budget for non-
municipal projects has proven to be rather complicated, especially concerning projects that last longer than a financial biennium or the three-year-contracts for Mr 
Liedke and Mr Schulz-Baldes. This is why the funded projects are rather small in financial terms (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
40 Obviously, money is what the city does not have under the condition of budget plight. As assumed by local government experts, this represents a 
challenge for the local government. E.g. it has been difficult to achieve the participation of companies in the Klimastadt project (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
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5. Project Area Buildings, Construction and Remediation 
5.1 Working Group ‘Construction and Remediation’ 
 
Of the six working groups, ‘construction and remediation’ is the most important one for this 
thesis. It originated from the working group ‘environmental protection, nature conversation 
and urban development’, which held its first meeting in July 2010 under leadership of the 
department head for buildings and construction, Volker Holm. At the second meeting in 
February 2011, the group was renamed ‘construction and infrastructure’ and still included 
members of the transportation infrastructure sector. By that time energiekonsens became a 
member of the group as well (Becker, interview 20.02.14).  
The six group meetings under the leadership of Volker Holm were of an administrative 
manner for which no funding was made available. Thus, the actual outcome remained limited 
(as was also the case in other working groups). In May 2013, Mr Holm retired and Heinfried 
Becker, who is head of the Bremerhaven office of energiekonsens, took over the leadership 
while giving the group its current name. The group now includes actors from municipal and 
commercial construction as well as those working in the sector of single- and two-family 
houses (Becker, interview 20.02.14)41. Mr Becker also made other modifications, e.g. he 
changed the working methods of the group. Now, seven to eight people take general 
decisions on project issues. Specific projects are planned in smaller groups to save time for 
each member. Accordingly, Mr Wöhlken mentioned that the working group is luckily not 
meeting too often (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). Moreover, technicians and executive 
members often meet one after another to discuss problems that are specific to their field of 
knowledge or area of responsibility (Becker, interview 20.02.14).  
Mr Wöhlken and Mr Lückehe both became members of the group in the summer 201342. They 
pointed out that the benefits of the working group are especially its networking possibilities 
(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14).  
 
5.2 The Project on Hydraulic Balancing 
 
The working group ‘construction and remediation’ is currently working on a project on 
hydraulic balancing43. The project constitutes a very good example for assessing the 
motivation of the different actors. It also illustrates how topics enter the discussions within 
the group and are also taken up by individual members from the group. 
The project, which is based on the enabling governing mode, was initiated after the idea by 
the local government and energiekonsens to train crafts enterprises in hydraulic balancing 
failed in Bremerhaven, because only one company showed interest (Scherzinger, interview 
14.02.14). energiekonsens therefore approached the STÄWOG and the University of Applied 
                                                 
41 Apart from energiekonsens, Seestadt Immobilien, and the STÄWOG, the other members of the group are the administrative office of the Klimastadt, the 
Association of German Architects in Bremen, the Chamber of Handicrafts Bremen, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce Bremerhaven, the City Council of 
Bremerhaven (Department for Construction), the District Craft Trades Association Bremerhaven-Wesermünde, the Guild of the Building Trade Bremerhaven-
Wesermünde, and the University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven (Klimastadt Bremerhaven 2013: 15). 
42 The STÄWOG had been part of the working group since 2010. However, Mr Lückehe became general manager in August 2013, and therefore member of 
the group (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Stäwog 2013b: 2). 
43 The term hydraulic balancing describes the optimising of a building’s heating or cooling system through a balanced distribution of water in different 
circuits to provide the intended indoor climate at optimum energy efficiency and minimal operating cost (Becker, interview 20.02.14). Hydraulic balancing is a 
rather simple and cheap possibility to significantly reduce CO2 emissions (Bremerhavener Modernisieren 2013; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
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Sciences within the working group to realise a pilot project on a simplified calculation 
method for hydraulic balancing. The STÄWOG now provides six structurally identical 
apartment buildings for the project. Two are run as before, two use the ordinary calculation 
method, and two use the new, simplified method of the University of Applied Sciences 
(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; STÄWOG 2013a: 13). Mr Scherzinger and Mr Becker hope that 
the results of the study will have a stimulating effect on both businesses and citizens (Becker, 
interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).  
With regard to the motivation of the various actors, Mr Scherzinger stated that the Office for 
Environmental Protection approached energiekonsens with the request to direct their 
attention to the private sector and especially the hydraulic balancing to take a further step 
towards the reduction target of the KEP 2020. Hydraulic balancing in private homes does 
definitely not fall within the traditional scope of functions of local governments. Therefore, 
this project supports the hypothesis of this thesis which is that the project Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven enables the city to increase its spheres of activity.  
As the Office for Environmental Protection has neither the staff (or the technical knowledge) 
nor the financial resources to carry out its own projects, it depends on the cooperation (i.e. 
the governing mode partnership) with other actors such as energiekonsens or business 
companies (Becker, interview 20.02.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Accordingly, Mr 
Becker pointed out that the city has no priority fields of action, which means that 
energiekonsens or the working groups usually decide which specific project areas they want 
to work on. energiekonsens for instance, focuses currently on single- and two-family home 
owners (Becker, interview 20.02.14). Additionally, the issue of hydraulic balancing was not 
new to energiekonsens; on the contrary, they already had a programme on this issue in 
Bremen (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
For the Office for Environmental Protection and energiekonsens the reduction of CO2 
emissions according to the KEP 2020 is the primary goal for all activities. This is why 
energiekonsens is strongly committed to the Klimastadt project. In any case, the city of 
Bremer-haven has no direct influence on the work of energiekonsens as only the city of 
Bremen is one of the three shareholders. This implies guidelines and project areas are inter 
alia shaped by political considerations of the city of Bremen, e.g. Mr Becker explained that 
sensitising of consumers and similar ‘soft’ steering instruments have lately lost in importance 
for the benefit of projects concerning construction/remediation and businesses (Becker, 
interview 20.02.14). energiekonsens relies solely on the governing modes enabling and 
partnership. In the interview, Mr Becker explained that energiekonsens mostly coordinates 
projects and acts as a multiplier of best practices. Therefore, projects are typically 
implemented in cooperation with business or civil society actors, just as in the project on 
hydraulic balancing.  
Mr Lückehe explained that the STÄWOG participates in the project, because of the 
collaboration with the University of Applied Sciences in Bremerhaven. He emphasised: “We 
want to support it as a study location and promote the quality of teaching through practical 
orientation” (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, translation by the author). The STÄWOG does not 
depend on the (rather small amount of) money provided for the Klimastadt projects. Instead, 
Mr Lückehe participates because he believes “it is the right approach” (Lückehe, interview 
04.03.14, translation by the author). Moreover, the steering group and the Climate City Office 
are of no relevance for Mr Lückehe. The same is true for Mr Wöhlken (Wöhlken, interview 
25.02.14). This could be interpreted as a missed opportunity for political steering. 
Alternatively, it could be seen as a success to achieve a clear distribution of tasks that limits 
the ‘actor cannibalism’ mentioned by Scherzinger (interview 14.02.14).  
Even though Seestadt Immobilien is not directly involved in the project on hydraulic 
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balancing, Mr Wöhlken stressed that the project topics are reflected by the various group 
members. For instance, Seestadt Immobilien decided to undertake its own study on hydraulic 
balancing. Two identical school buildings are part of this study. Hydraulic balancing will be 
carried out in one of the buildings. The energy consumption of both buildings is then 
measured over a period of one to two years. Moreover, Mr Wöhlken wants to introduce the 
issue of passive houses into the working group (Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14).  
 
5.3 Modernisation Projects of the Interviewees and Municipal Influence 
 
In the building sector, Bremerhaven has always been under pressure to reduce its energy 
costs because of its poverty (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). Therefore, energy-efficiency 
projects have been important to the interviewed group members even before the Klimastadt 
project was initiated. As stated by Wollmann (2006: 438f.; 2012: 437), the financial constraints 
of Bremerhaven prove to be a major limiting factor for municipal steering attempts and the 
possibility to increase municipal scope of action. The following project examples substantiate 
this finding. 
The major energy efficiency projects of Seestadt Immobilien concern the new construction of 
day-care centres for children less than three years old (Seestadt Immobilien 2013: 53f.). Half of 
the new buildings (i.e. three) are constructed according to the certified passive house 
standard. The idea came from an employee and was then taken to the political level for a 
decision. This was necessary because the investment costs were considerably higher than for 
other new buildings. Mr Schneeberg stated that the Greens especially played an important 
role, as they highly appreciated the idea of passive house day-care centres (Schneeberg, 
interview 25.02.14).  
The professional training of two employees for certified passive building was financed by 
Seestadt Immobilien with their own resources, “knowing that this is where the journey leads 
to” (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14, translation by the author). Mr Schneeberg explained: 
“With regards to the EnEV, the differences in the standards are no longer so far apart […], and 
the guidelines of the EnEV are our benchmark for standard buildings” (Schneeberg, interview 
25.02.14, translation by the author). The first daycare centre with passive house standard was 
supported by energiekonsens as a pilot project. For instance, the evaluation of the energy 
savings was paid by energiekonsens (and realised by the University of Applied Sciences 
Bremerhaven).  
A ‘show case project’ was the renewal of the lighting system in the sports hall “Bogenstraße” 
that allowed energy savings of at least 60 percent, corresponding to the energy consumption 
of ten single-family houses. 40 percent of the costs were provided by funding from the 
National Climate Protection Initiative (Seestadt Immobilien 2014). Yet, most projects are 
funded through own municipal resources; additional grants are generally rare. This is one 
reason, why Seestadt Immobilien wants to enhance efforts to receive money from the KfW 
which is a state-owned investment bank (Schneeberg, interview 25.02.14).  
Since 1997, the STÄWOG has improved the energy efficiency of approximately 2,000 of its 
5,200 apartments. This energy-focused building refurbishment included at least a façade 
renovation and usually a renewed heating system. A major reason for this can be found in the 
declining housing market. The STÄWOG has to make an increased effort to rent apartments, 
and revenues are substantially lower than in growing markets. Moreover, energy costs 
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present an increasing challenge44.  
Thus, the STÄWOG has to find ‘creative solutions’ such as its own energy production. With its 
subsidiary STÄSERVICE, the STÄWOG has now served as an energy supplier for several years 
(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Schmidt 2013: 147f.). A decentralised generation of heat and 
electricity via combined heat and power technology is provided by nine block-type thermal 
power stations. Four of them have been put into operation in 2013. Currently, around 10 
percent of all tenants are supplied with electricity produced in their own buildings. According 
to Mr Lückehe, this procedure is a win-win-win situation: environment benefits from reduced 
CO2 emissions, tenants pay 1.5 cents less per kWh than in the basic scheme of the local 
provider, and the company can generate additional profits (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, 
STÄWOG 2013a: 4).  
According to a study by the agWohnen45, which was conducted by the Frauenhofer IFAM in 
Bremen, the STÄWOG emitted almost 9,500t CO2 in 2011. This corresponds to 24 kg/m2a 
which is the best result of all housing associations in the city state. The STÄWOG was able to 
reduce its emissions by 23 percent between 2005 and 2011 (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).  
The projects of the STÄWOG are highly appreciated. Mr Scherzinger stated “The STÄWOG 
develops its activities exactly where we need them” (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14; 
translation by the author). While the STÄWOG is in principle free to decide what it wants to 
do, in practice its staff is always open to discussions with the city and it has the community 
interest in mind. Moreover, local politicians have direct influence via the advisory board 
(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). In addition, the STÄWOG 
considers itself more of a service company for the city rather than a mere housing association 
as it formerly was (Stäwog 2013b: 7). Thus, the formal privatisation does not pose any 
problems. 
Overall, the determining factor for modernisation projects is usually their financial feasibility. 
Thus, financial incentive programmes, are crucial for the work of the STÄWOG. These financial 
incentive programmes all belong to the ‘soft’ steering instruments of governing through 
enabling and highlight once again the importance of such steering instruments for the 
Klimastadt project. 
Modernisation projects of the STÄWOG are almost exclusively supported by national funding 
programmes such as “Soziale Stadt” (‘Socially Integrative City’) and “Stadtumbau West” 
(‘Urban Reconstruction West’), or the social housing promotion programme of Bremen which 
nevertheless includes requirements of a certain energy standard. The federal KfW 
programmes are basically used for every single energy-efficient modernisation project. The 
state programme “rationelle Energienutzung” (‘rational energy use’) helps to finance the 
block-type thermal power stations (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).  
Local politics only plays a very limited role in the allocation of funding, e.g. the local 
parliament and the building committee grant the money for the programme Stadtumbau 
West to the STÄWOG (Stäwog 2013b: 5). Besides, the incentive programmes, Mr Lückehe also 
mentioned local regulations that do matter, e.g. construction development areas 
(“Bauentwicklungsgebiete”) with specific requirements (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).  
 
5.4 Overall Significance of the Brand Name “Klimastadt Bremerhaven” 
                                                 
44 There are two major challenges for housing associations: energy consumption and demographic change (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14). 
45 The agWohnen is a network of all major housing associations and companies in the state of Bremen. 
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In the interview, Mr Becker and Mr Wöhlken stressed that the term “Klimastadt” is still a rather 
vague term and has different meanings to different people. Mr Becker (interview 20.02.14) 
identified the existence of a kind of ‘climate city spirit’ (“Geist Klimastadt”) which is stimulated 
by the climate protection measures of energiekonsens (among others). However, Mr Becker 
did not see the Klimastadt project as a tool to get citizens and business to actually take 
climate protection measures. On the contrary, he explained that several business actors had 
withdrawn from the process when the focus of the former R&D concept shifted and 
organisational structures remained unsettled (in the period 2010–2012).  
Moreover, Mr Wöhlken (interview 25.02.14) mentioned that until now it has been difficult to 
motivate citizens to take action themselves. This poses a problem for the whole project as the 
local government is not able to implement the idea “Klimastadt Bremerhaven” on its own. Mr 
Scherzinger agrees: “On behalf of the Magistrat, we can usually only appeal to the private 
sector […]. Therefore, our project controlling with the ‘master plan active climate policy’ and 
the eea […] is effective only to a very limited extent. We are dependent on the initiative of 
businesses and private households in order to achieve our CO2 reduction target” (BIS 2013: 6, 
translation by the author). 
Mr Becker therefore highlighted that Bremerhaven’s societal actors should be integrated 
further into the project. In his opinion, the overall societal context of the project is very 
important, especially as the issues of climate change and climate protection are concerned. 
Yet, according to Mr Becker, political actors in Bremerhaven still hope that they will be able 
exert direct influence on non-state actors though the city’s administration (Becker, interview 
20.02.14).  
As exemplified above, the STÄWOG and Seestadt Immobilien both stated in the interviews 
that climate protection projects are usually initiated within their own organisation and as a 
result of financial constraints. This finding suggests that the actors decide independently 
upon projects, so that the local government’s scope of action would not be expanded. 
According to Mr Lückehe and Mr Wöhlken, the existence of the Klimastadt project only 
facilitates the communication of climate protection projects towards the local government. In 
addition, both stated that profitability is the major reason for action, including most energy-
efficiency measures (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; Schneeberg/Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14). 
These statements were confirmed by Mr Scherzinger who explained that lots of measures in 
the building sector are taken out of financial necessity (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
For the STÄWOG, Mr Lückehe described the relevance of the brand name “Klimastadt” as 
follows: “The brand name has a relevance to our shareholder, the city, and thus also for us” 
(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14, translation by the author). He perceived it as an ‘orientation’ 
that the STÄWOG picks up, although the project Klimastadt is not the reason why the 
STÄWOG undertakes modernisation projects. Instead the main reason is that the company 
wants to develop its housing stocks for the long term.  
Nevertheless, municipal influence may be stronger, than it first appears as the Klimastadt 
project has also a rather concrete impact on the STÄWOG. As a municipal Ltd, the company 
takes a broader view towards the city’s needs instead of concentrating solely on its own 
return as companies usually do. This implies that a renovation concept may sometimes be 
implemented even if this involves a financial loss for the STÄWOG. The decisive factor is the 
benefit for the shareholder which can be an improvement in urban structures, population 
growth or the contribution to an important political objective such as the Klimastadt46 
                                                 
46 This understanding of return of investment is discussed in the German literature under the term “Stadtrendite”, meaning an added-value for the city 
apart from the financial return (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14), for further information see for instance Hartwig/Kroneberg 2012. 
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(Lückehe, interview 04.03.14).  
Seestadt Immobilien attaches more importance to the Klimastadt project than the STÄWOG 
does. Mr Wöhlken explained: “The Klimastadt supports our own activities considerably” 
(Wöhlken, interview 25.02.14, translation by the author). The Klimastadt initiative becomes 
relevant if projects are on the brink of being unprofitable. In this case, the aim of becoming 
Klimastadt is an argument in favor of, for instance, passive houses, even if the payback period 
is ten years or more. In such cases, a balance has to be struck between economic 
considerations and the political goals.  
As a city-owned enterprise, Seestadt Immobilien is aware of its exemplary function. This is 
why the visibility of climate protection measures is important to Seestadt Immobilien whose 
projects can motivate citizens to take similar action (Schneeberg/Wöhlken, interview 
25.02.14). Mr Scherzinger also wants to create more publicity for the excellent facility 
management of Seestadt Immobilien (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
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6. Conclusion and Perspectives 
 
This dissertation has examined the potential of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven to enable 
the local authority to expand its scope of action and to develop new spheres of activity in the 
policy area of climate protection.  
The empirical part was based on several theoretical assumptions. As climate change policy is 
part of the voluntary tasks of local self-government, in principle the room for manoeuvre 
should be substantial (Difu 2011: 11). However, local government experts argue that it 
becomes more and more difficult for municipalities to fulfil those voluntary tasks. As was 
pointed out in chapter 3.2, this is due to three major trends – EU liberalisation, NPM, and 
budgetary crisis – that led to privatisations and, ultimately, to a fragmentation of cities’ 
administrations. Therefore, local governments lost steering capacity (e.g. Bogumil 2006; 
Kuhlmann 2006; Wollmann 2006).  
In general, this study has found that especially the budgetary crisis reduces municipal room 
for manoeuvre in the building sector, while EU liberalisation and NPM did not seem to 
considerably restrict the scope of action in this project area. This corresponds to more recent 
findings of Wollmann (2012: 437f.) who also identifies financial constraints as the major threat 
to local self-government.  
Contrary to what had been suggested by Sack (2006: 31) and Wollmann (2006: 446), formal 
privatisation (as in the case of the STÄWOG) did not seem to cause any tensions between the 
logic of competitiveness on the one hand, and demands for orientation towards the general 
public interest on the other. This argument can be supported by the fact that Mr Scherzinger 
highlighted the valuable cooperation with the STÄWOG while Mr Lückehe explained the self-
image of the STÄWOG as a service provider for the city (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14; 
Scherzinger, interview 14.04.14).  
The assumptions of the multilevel governance approach in EU integration theories did not 
predict a clear cut trend for local steering capacity. While EU funding and opportunities for 
participation increase municipal room for manoeuvre, the necessity to operate on the supra-
national or international level can also overstretch municipalities, especially those with 
limited resources (e.g. Fleurke/Willemse 2007; Münch 2006). The multilevel governance 
approach also emphasises ‘soft’ steering instruments such as city networks, monitoring and 
benchmarking or declaratory commitments in contrast to binding regulation (e.g. Wallace 
2010: 98ff.).  
The findings of this dissertation suggest that ‘soft’ steering instruments are indeed very 
important for the city to encourage the implementation of specific projects. Probably most 
important is the CO2 monitoring of the KEP 2020 which is a central steering instrument for 
local climate protection measures. The working groups themselves and the project examples 
with municipal influence presented in this thesis can be categorised under the governing 
modes enabling and partnership. Even the mission statement is a declaratory commitment 
and therefore a ‘soft’ instrument. Governing by regulation proved to be important only for 
political framework programmes. 
The empirical findings indicate that the hypothesis of this thesis can be confirmed. The 
analysis showed that the idea to make use of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven as a 
coordination mechanism was introduced by the Greens in summer 2011. Moreover, the new 
institutional structure of the Climate City Office and the establishment of the steering group 
are supposed to ensure that actions and measures taken by various actors in government, 
business, and civil society are consistent and coherent as well as in line with the political 
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objective to reduce 40 percent of the city’s CO2 emissions. To achieve this aim, the Climate 
City Office promotes networking, pools PR work, and coordinates activities of the 
participating actors.  
With regards to the second part of the hypothesis of whether the project Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven is used by the municipality to increase its spheres of (political) influence and its 
scope of action, the empirical findings put forward in this thesis suggest that the local 
government has been partially successful in doing this.  
The analysis of the development process of the Klimastadt revealed that the change of 
government in 2011 to a Red-Green coalition led to the launch of a process Klimastadt with 
the clear aim of a societal development and a participatory approach involving the 
population of Bremerhaven. Yet, according to the interviewed working group members, the 
Klimastadt has no motivating effect on them. On the contrary, they argued, the aim of 
becoming the Klimastadt Bremerhaven facilitates the communication of their climate 
protection and modernisation projects vis-à-vis the local government. This finding suggests 
that actors decide independently upon projects, so that the municipal scope of action would 
not be expanded.  
However, concerning the local and regional political framework programmes, it was shown 
that the eea, but especially the KEP 2020 and the ‘master plan active climate policy’ are 
relevant instruments for political steering of state and non-state actors. The ‘master plan’ and 
the KEP 2020 are not only instruments of self-governing, but also tools to get other actors to 
contribute to the binding 40 percent target. As these programmes include projects of actors 
that cannot be directly controlled by the local authorities, the 40 percent target creates a 
certain obligation for all actors involved. It could be considered a success of political steering 
that all interviewees stated their willingness to contribute to this objective. That also implies 
that the local government increases its influence in spheres of climate protection activity that 
do not fall under the traditional scope of action of German municipalities. 
The interview with Mr Scherzinger revealed that the new Climate City Office was mainly 
established to clarify responsibilities and to facilitate municipal steering. Thus, the confusion 
about the term “Klimastadt” and the different strands of the Klimastadt project, did not lead 
to unsettled responsibilities or a fragmentation of climate policies as local government 
experts might have argued. Instead the institutional structure with the new Climate City 
Office and the steering group was established to keep the whole project under the 
supervision of the Environmental Councillor.  
The institutional arrangement was finally brought about by political decisions; in other words, 
through governing by regulation. Hence, the local legislative power (i.e. the 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung) did not face a decisive loss of influence as was suggested by 
Bogumil and Jann (2009: 194). Instead it has been crucial to establish the Klimastadt project 
and climate policy framework programmes.  
The institutional set-up of the Klimastadt project now incorporates non-state actors in a 
partially administrative structure. This coincides with the growing role of non-state actors in 
decision-making processes assumed by Marks (1992; 1993) and is especially true for the 
steering group for climate policies and the working groups. The city is therefore able to 
influence areas that go beyond the traditionally municipal spheres of activity.  
An illustrative example for this is the energy-efficient modernisation of public buildings and 
private houses in Bremerhaven examined in sections 5.2 and 5.3. As there are no direct 
steering possibilities vis-à-vis the working groups, the city uses ‘soft’ instruments such as 
networking and financial incentives to increase its scope of action in this area. Financial 
means (and in particular fiscal incentives) have proven to be crucial for the interviewed group 
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members. However, the sparse financial resources for the Klimastadt project groups were not 
of great importance to energiekonsens, Seestadt Immobilien and the STÄWOG. Instead, Mr 
Lückehe enumerated several financial incentive programmes of the German federal 
government and the state of Bremen that the STÄWOG uses for its modernisation projects. 
Thus, the financial constraints of Bremerhaven have proven to be a major limiting factor for 
steering attempts and the possibility to increase municipal scope of action in the area of 
building, construction, and remediation.  
Energy-efficiency projects such as hydraulic balancing would have also been a suitable 
example to test the assumptions of ecological modernisation as environmental problems are 
tried to solve with the help of technological innovations in this case. Yet, this dissertation 
could not do so, due to reasons of space.  
Another limitation of this dissertation is the fact that it focused almost exclusively on the local 
level. Therefore, several of the theoretical assumptions of the multilevel governance approach 
in EU integration studies can neither be confirmed nor rejected. Against this background, it 
would be interesting to conduct further research that should include action on the regional, 
national, supranational, and international level to assess the importance of such action (both 
in terms of opportunities and limitations). For example, it would be interesting to assess 
Bremerhaven’s participation in city networks such as the Climate Alliance or the regional 
project IKSK. Both are suitable examples of horizontal cooperation which complements 
traditional hierarchical top-down governmental action according to the multi-level 
governance approach (Brunnengräber: 2007:333f.).  
The ‘integrated climate protection concept’, for instance, was initiated by Bremerhaven and 
taken up by the well-established cross-state network Regionalforum Bremerhaven. In the 
long run, the IKSK could help to reduce emissions through an improved coordination of 
public transport and commuter streams in the region or it could facilitate district heating 
supply from Bremerhaven to Lower Saxony (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14).  
Thirdly, this thesis only focused on the project area of buildings, construction and 
remediation. However, the KEP 2020 identified four areas of climate protection activities that 
are under the responsibility of cities and municipalities: (1) electricity and heat supply, (2) 
planning and construction, (3) mobility, and (4) traffic/transportation (Freie Hansestadt 
Bremen 2010: Preface). Taking an even broader view, Mr Schulz-Baldes determined six 
municipal areas of responsibility for climate protection while adding (5) internal organisation 
and (6) cooperation and communication (Schulz-Baldes 2012a: 6). Therefore, further research 
would be required to explore other areas of local climate action and to interview more actors 
from business and civil society with the aim of finding out whether the municipal scope for 
action, steering capacity, and modes of governing vary from one sphere of activity to another. 
Fourthly, the area of climate change adaptation will gain more importance in the future. But 
for now, adaptation does not play any decisive role in Bremerhaven. Mr Scherzinger 
anticipated that it will not be until 2020 that the city starts to work on solid plans for climate 
change adaptation (Scherzinger, interview 14.02.14). 
Finally, the question concerning the long-term success of the project Klimastadt Bremerhaven 
cannot be conclusively answered as both the involvement of private sector actors and 
citizens has proven to be difficult to achieve. However, despite conceptual uncertainty, 
diverse understandings, and criticism, all interviewees agree that the idea of a Klimastadt is, in 
principle, a very good one. All interviewees supported the idea because they believe in the 
positive effects (both potential and realised) of the Klimastadt idea for both the city and its 
citizens in the long run. Mr Lückehe considered the positive image factor of the Klimastadt to 
be especially important (Lückehe, interview 04.03.14). Mr Becker was hopeful that the 
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Klimastadt can contribute to bring together the urban society in Bremerhaven while he 
concluded: “The brand name Klimastadt could result in an incredibly positive energy […], 
until now we can only guess what that could mean for Bremerhaven” (Becker, interview 
20.02.14) 
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Annex 
 
Annex I: List of interviews 
Date, Time Interviewee(s) Location Duration
14.02.2014, 
1 pm 
Till Scherzinger, Office for 
Environmental Protection 
Caspar David & Co., café-
restaurant, Bremerhaven 
1 h 
45 min 
20.02.2014, 
11 am 
Heinfried Becker, Head of the 
Office of energiekonsens in 
Bremerhaven 
Office of energiekonsens in 
Bremerhaven (in the shared 
office KLIMA*HAVEN)  
1 h 
15 min 
25.02.2014, 
3 pm 
Holger Schneeberg, Seestadt 
Immobilien, Head of Building 
Services Engineering 
Department; Lothar Wöhlken, 
Technical Operations Manager 
of Seestadt Immobilien (for the 
last 20 min) 
Office of Seestadt 
Immobilien at the 
Stadthaus 4 of the 
municipal administration 
of Bremerhaven 
1 h
04.03.2014, 
3 pm 
Sieghard Lückehe, General 
Manager of the STÄWOG 
STÄWOG’s registered office 
in Bremerhaven 
1 h
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Annex II: Organisational Chart of the Klimastadt Project (diagram by author) 
 
 
 
